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Positivism and the 
Notion of an Offense 
Claire Finkelsteint 
Yet law-abiding scholars write 
Law is neither wrong nor right.-W.H. Auden 
While the United States Supreme Court has developed an elaborate 
constitutional jurisprudence of criminal procedure, it has articulated few 
constitutional doctrines of the substantive criminal law. The asymmetry 
between substance and procedure seems natural given the demise of 
Lochner and the minimalist stance towards due process outside the area of 
fundamental rights. This Article, however, argues that the "positivistic" 
approach to defining criminal offenses stands in some tension with other 
basic principles, both constitutional and moral. In particular, two impor- 
tant constitutional guarantees depend on the notion of an offense: the pre- 
sumption of innocence and the ban on double jeopardy. Under the 
positivistic orthodoxy, the scope of these doctrines is left to state legisla- 
tures to determine. The presumption of innocence and the ban on double 
jeopardy thus suggest the needfor a substantive conception of the notion of 
'an offense. This Article attempts to provide a jurisprudential framework 
for developing such a conception. It proceeds from the idea that we have a 
presumption against the use of the criminal sanction, stemming from the 
commitment to a background right to liberty our constitutional jurispru- 
dence contains. The use of the criminal sanction is justified only if the 
infringement of liberty it imposes is sufficient to overcome that presump- 
tion. This requirement of justification in turn suggests boundaries on the 
notion of an offense: The definition of an offense must be constructed in a 
way that makes the infringement of liberty justified in light of the harm the 
prohibited conduct inflicts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among the various questions to which criminal law theorists could 
devote their attention, one might expect "What is a crime?" to rank first 
and foremost. Surprisingly little effort, however, has been expended 
answering it. Moreover, there is little consensus even among those who 
have studied the matter closely. Some think of a crime as an immoral act, 
taking the view that all and only immoral acts ought to be punished. Oth- 
ers adopt a more relativistic position, claiming that a crime is a commu- 
nity's emphatic denunciation of a type of conduct, and that the only 
legitimate basis for criminalization is social. Still others offer an economic 
rationale, maintaining that a crime is a coercive transfer of resources from 
victim to perpetrator, which is inefficient because it bypasses an available 
voluntary market.3 
Ironically, one answer academics do not normally advance is the 
answer the American legal system has most consistently endorsed: A 
crime is whatever a legislature passes into law under the heading 
"criminal." Our legal system, in short, takes a predominantly positivistic 
approach to the notion of crime, meaning that there is no particular struc- 
ture or content that legislation denominated "criminal" must have. As 
Henry Hart wrote a number of years ago, "If one were to judge from the 
notions apparently underlying many judicial opinions, and the overt 
language even of some of them ... a crime is anything which is called a 
crime, and a criminal penalty is simply the penalty provided for doing 
anything which has been given that name."4 This suggests a gap between 
academic intuitions and judicial behavior about the nature of crime. Aca- 
demics search for criteria to determine which activities are proper objects 
of prohibition, based on their adherence to norms that they believe ought to 
govern the use of the criminal sanction. Judicial oversight of criminal stat- 
utes, by contrast, proceeds as if no such norms were available. One 
explanation for this gap might be that academics who have offered a 
general account of crime have not for the most part attempted to translate 
their theories into concrete proposals for defining offenses. A theory of 
crime will remain judicially idle unless it can also provide a way of identi- 
fying constraints on the kinds of criminal statutes legislatures may draft. 
1. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 637-67 (1997). H.L.A. Hart coined the expression 
"legal moralism" to refer to this position. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 6 (1963); see 
also infra Part III (discussing Moore on legal moralism). 
2. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 6-8 (1967). 
3. See Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 
(1985) (presenting a theory of crime in terms of an intentional bypass of an available voluntary 
market). 
4. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. ROBS. 401, 404 
(1958) (citations omitted). 
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The suggestion that the Court takes a positivistic stance towards the 
notion of an offense requires explanation. Historically, legal positivism has 
been contrasted with natural aw theories. In this sense, nearly all contem- 
porary legal doctrines are positivistic, in that they are self-avowedly con- 
ventional, not natural.5 We might also say, however, that a legal doctrine or 
concept is "positivistic" if it derives its content entirely from legislative 
pronouncement. It is substantive, or nonpositivistic, if it derives its content 
at least in part from deeper and more fundamental principles. Where the 
notion of an offense is concerned, the nonpositivistic alternative is to treat 
the substantive provisions of the criminal aw as resting on a set of consti- 
tutional values. The Supreme Court's approach to the notion of an offense 
is positivistic in this sense, then, because the Court has been 
unwilling to constitutionalize the basic doctrines of the criminal aw. 
The Court's commitment o positivism has manifested itself most 
obviously in its approach to strict liability crimes, where it has gone to 
some lengths to avoid having to pronounce the inclusion of a mental state 
requirement in offense definitions a matter of constitutional mandate.6 The 
closest the Court has come to constitutionalizing mens rea was its declara- 
tion that traditional common law crimes should be construed as requiring 
scienter where the legislature is silent as to intent. This principle, however, 
is a rule of construction, not a constitutional requirement.7 The Canadian 
Supreme Court, by contrast, has been less restrained. It has found strict 
liability crimes "not in accordance with the precepts of fundamental 
justice" guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.8 The 
positivistic stance towards offense definition has also appeared in the 
Court's approach to the defenses of the criminal law. It is apparently a 
matter of constitutional indifference whether a state chooses to grant its 
citizens defenses such as provocation,9 self-defense,10 intoxication,1 
5. Even Ronald Dworkin, who argues that principles of our moral and political philosophy 
should inform the interpretation of both constitutional and statutory provisions, does not attempt to 
claim that these background principles are drawn from the natural order of the universe. He suggests 
instead that they are deep-seated commitments of our social practices, but that they nevertheless should 
occupy the kind of foundational position that precepts of natural law might once have occupied. See 
RONALD WORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, 78-85, 266-71 (1986). The only prominent contemporary legal 
theorist who endorses natural law theory wholeheartedly is John Finnis. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL AW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). 
6. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (holding president of company 
criminally liable for drug shipment of which he was entirely ignorant); United States v. Balint, 258 
U.S. 250, 252 (1922) (accepting strict liability statute designed for "social betterment" rather than 
punishment); see also Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 832 (1999) 
and sources cited therein. 
7. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (establishing a rule that common law 
crimes contain a mens rea requirement if legislature silent on mental state). 
8. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), cl. 
11, ?7. 
9. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (upholding New York law shifting burden 
to prove provocation to defendant). 
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mistake of law,12 or even insanity."3 Similarly, the Constitution supposedly 
has little to say about the use of legal presumptions,14 despite the serious 
constitutional difficulties they appear to raise when used to prove the ele- 
ments of a criminal offense.15 
The Court's commitment to positivism about offense definition, how- 
ever, has not been monolithic. One exception is the line of cases establish- 
ing restrictions on the way criminal offenses are drafted, stemming 
principally from the due process requirement that citizens be placed on 
notice of their potential subjection to criminal sanctions.16 Statutes have 
been routinely struck down for failing to identify the prohibited conduct 
with precision, or for casting the net of criminalization too broadly, 
thus subjecting individuals to criminal punishment for engaging in ordi- 
nary, protected activities.17 Another is the line of cases represented by 
Robinson v. California,'8 in which the Court struck down legislation crimi- 
nalizing a defendant's condition. There are even isolated cases, Lambert v. 
10. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (upholding Ohio's burden-shifting provision with 
respect to self-defense on grounds that state has no obligation to provide defense of self-defense). 
11. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (upholding state law rendering evidence of 
voluntary intoxication inadmissible). 
12. See United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971). The 
Court has nevertheless eroded this principle around the edges by declaring a rule of statutory 
construction in favor of such a defense. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) 
(interpreting mens rea requirements with regard to mistake of law). 
13. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (upholding state law shifting burden of proof on 
insanity defense). 
14. See Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928) (holding use of presumptions a matter of legislative 
discretion). 
15. The Court has however found the use of mandatory presumptions unconstitutional. See Ulster 
County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979) (finding mandatory presumptions troublesome 
because they affect both the strength and placement of the "no reasonable doubt" burden); Sandstrom 
v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521-523 (1979) (rejecting mandatory presumptions on the grounds that they 
establish a conclusive inference). See generally Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, 
Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE 
L.J. 165, 178 (1969) (arguing that burden of persuasion operating under permissible inference is no 
different from any other burden of persuasion). 
16. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (finding Jacksonville vagrancy 
ordinance void for vagueness on grounds that it fails to give persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice 
that contemplated conduct is forbidden and because it encourages arbitrary arrests and convictions). 
17. The so-called "overbreadth" cases have mainly concerned First Amendment rights. See 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down ordinance prohibiting cross burning as 
overbroad); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down law making it illegal to deface flag); 
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989) ("Overbreadth is a judicially created doctrine 
designed to prevent chilling of protected expression."); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 
(1974) (striking down statute on grounds that it is susceptible of application to speech protected by 
First Amendment); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (upholding decision of Fifth Circuit 
striking down statute criminalizing using "'opprobrious words or abusive language"' as vague and 
overbroad). 
18. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (striking down statute criminalizing status of being an addict). But see 
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (holding that punishment for public drunkenness is no violation 
of due process). 
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California'9 providing the best example, in which the Court has 
invalidated criminal legislation because of its discomfort with the use of 
strict liability, despite the official stance that criminalization in the absence 
of mens rea is constitutionally acceptable. 
The largest area of substantive review, however, is the line of cases 
reviving the doctrine of substantive due process. The most significant of 
these are the cases vindicating a constitutional right to privacy. Here the 
Court has been unabashed in engaging in substantive review of criminal 
legislation to protect a nonenumerated right. Under this heading, the Court 
has refused to allow states to prohibit the use of birth control between mar- 
ried persons,20 the use of pornographic material in the privacy of one's 
home,21 the right of women to choose to terminate an unwanted preg- 
nancy,22 the right of minors to seek an abortion without parental notice,23 
and even the right of homosexuals to challenge legislation discriminating 
against them.24 
This is not to deny the Court's persistent unease with its own inter- 
mittent willingness to police the boundaries of the substantive criminal 
law. As Charles Nesson has written, "each time the Court has ventured into 
substantive limitation theory it has quickly retreated."25 Thus Robinson26 
19. 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (finding ordinance requiring convicted felons to register with the police 
in Los Angeles within five days of arrival unconstitutional). 
20. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down Connecticut statute 
illegalizing use of birth control). 
21. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (striking down Georgia statute making 
private possession of obscene matter a crime). 
22. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy includes a woman's 
decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy). 
23. See Guste v. Jackson, 429 U.S. 399 (1977) (vacating an injunction against enforcement of a 
Louisiana statute forbidding the performance of an abortion on a minor without her parents' or 
husband's consent). 
24. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down Amendment 2 of Colorado State 
Constitution on grounds that it denies gays and lesbians equal protection of the law). Granted, the 
official doctrine insists that the only reason there is federal judicial power to review criminalization 
decisions in this area for more than their rationality is that privacy is a recognized fundamental right. 
Like free speech, infringements on the right to privacy must be justified by a "compelling state 
interest." But this rationale has seemed to many somewhat disingenuous, for at least two reasons. First, 
the only real support for the idea of a fundamental constitutional right to privacy are the very cases 
striking down privacy-infringing legislation. See supra notes 20-22 and sources cited therein. Second, 
arguably the more natural way to understand the interests at stake in such cases is that they are aspects 
of a right to liberty. But since the demise of Lochner, official doctrine has rejected the idea that the Due 
Process Clause contains a general notion of liberty with independent constitutional meaning, apart from 
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights and those "liberty" interests a state chooses to grant its citizens. 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
25. Charles R. Nesson, Rationality, Presumptions, and Judicial Comment: A Response to 
Professor Allen, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1581 (1981) (citations omitted) (critiquing Ronald Allen's 
theory of burden-shifting devices). 
26. 370 U.S. at 660 (holding required 90-day imprisonment based on the "status" of narcotic 
addict inflicted "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
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was followed by Powell,27 Furman28 by Gregg,29 and Mullaney3 by 
Patterson.31 The same dynamic appears to be at work between Solem32 and 
Harmelin,33 Grady34 and Dixon,35 and even perhaps Lambert36 and later 
decisions like Park.37 But instead of concluding, as Nesson does, that the 
Court is permanently set against substantive limitation theory, one might 
see the history as attesting to a pull in the opposite direction. Our constitu- 
tional tradition displays both tendencies, and while the rejection of a con- 
stitutionalized criminal aw enjoys strong support from the official demise 
of substantive due process, there are conflicting threads in our constitu- 
tional jurisprudence that merit consideration. 
This Article proposes a reexamination of the official rejection of sub- 
stantive limitation theory. Others have recently issued the same plea on the 
grounds that the sharp distinction between substantive and procedural rules 
with regard to judicial oversight cannot be justified.38 Still others argue that 
it should be unconstitutional to punish a person who is not blameworthy, 
and they accordingly propose that mens rea should be a constitutional 
requirement of all criminal offenses.39 The argument for constitutionalizing 
27. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (holding conviction for public drunkenness of one 
compelled to drink is not cruel and unusual punishment). 
28. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating Georgia death penalty law as arbitrary 
and capricious). 
29. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding revised death penalty statute based on 
scheme of guided discretion). 
30. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (holding Maine law placing burden on defendant to 
prove heat of passion or sudden provocation violates due process). 
31. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (placing burden on defendant to prove 
affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress does not violate due process). 
32. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding sentence of life imprisonment with no 
possibility of parole for nonviolent offense prohibited by the Eighth Amendment). 
33. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (holding mandatory life sentence with no 
possibility of parole for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine is not cruel and unusual 
punishment). 
34. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) (holding double jeopardy bars subsequent prosecution 
where prosecution must rely on proof of conduct that constituted an offense for which the defendant 
was already prosecuted). 
35. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) (holding ban on double jeopardy does not 
require that subsequent prosecutions satisfy a "same conduct test"). 
36. 355 U.S. at 225. 
37. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1978) (affirming, in general, validity of strict liability 
laws). 
38. See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1996) (discussing relation between criminal procedure and substantive criminal law). 
39. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The Supreme Court, Dr. Jekyll, and the Due Process of Proof, 
1996 SuP. CT. REV. 191; Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept 
of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322, 392-95 (1966); C. Peter Erlinder,Mens Rea, Due 
Process, and the Supreme Court: Toward a Constitutional Doctrine of Substantive Criminal Law, 9 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 163, 165-66 (1981); Hart, supra note 4, at 422-25; James J. Hippard, Sr., The 
Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault: An Argument for a Constitutional Doctrine of 
Mens Rea, 10 Hous. L. REV. 1039, 1039-40 (1973); John C. Jeffries & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, 
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the notion of an offense presented here, however, will not be based on the 
disparity between substance and procedure. Nor will it be based on the idea 
that only culpable agents should be punished. Instead, this Article will 
argue for the need for a substantive theory of offense definition by consid- 
ering two important constitutional guarantees: the presumption of inno- 
cence and the ban on double jeopardy. Under the positivistic approach to 
offense definition, both doctrines have become entirely subject to legisla- 
tive discretion. Something peculiar is at work, however, when the extent of 
a constitutional guarantee that ought to limit the reach of the criminal 
sanction is determined by the legislation establishing the sanction itself. 
While there are constitutional theories that would consider the statutory 
indebtedness of these doctrines a virtue,40 the more widely shared under- 
standing of constitutional rights is that they provide protection for indi- 
viduals against their government rather than a constitutional imprimatur for 
legislative judgment.41 
The kind of substantive limitation for which this Article will argue 
applies to the required criminal conduct instead of the mental state-the 
actus reus rather than the mens rea. This Article suggests that constitution- 
alizing the conduct instead of the mental state requirement-the "special," 
rather than the "general" part-will provide a more compelling source of 
limitation on offense definition.42 Mental state requirements do not restrict 
what a legislature can criminalize. For this reason, they do not by them- 
selves significantly enhance the freedom of individuals from unwanted 
governmental intrusion. If there is a constitutional presumption against the 
use of the criminal sanction, then, it cannot be overcome by showing that 
the defendant engaged in the prohibited conduct with a certain mental 
state. 
The presumption of innocence and the ban on double jeopardy 
strongly suggest the need for some substantive theory of offense definition. 
A more robust theory of these constitutional guarantees, however, would 
emerge from any number of nonpositivistic accounts of the notion of an 
offense. The latter half of this Article will attempt to provide the outlines 
of one such theory, based on the fact that criminal legislation is liberty- 
infringing. The claim is that the more a statute infringes the basic right to 
liberty, the stronger the presumption against it, and hence the greater the 
justification required to vindicate its use. This Article will argue that the 
Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979); Michaels, supra 
note 6; Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 107-10. 
40. See infra Part III (discussing the "positivist" theory of due process). 
41. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 383 
(1993) (presenting origin of constitutional rights as belief in natural entitlements enforceable against 
legislatures). 
42. See LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 2 (1987) (explaining distinction between 
general and special parts of criminal law). 
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correct substantive account of the notion of an offense is provided by 
determining when the use of the criminal sanction overcomes this pre- 
sumption. While all legislation is liberty-infringing in at least a weak 
sense, the degree of infringement is usually sufficiently minor that the 
interference can be easily justified by considerations of instrumental 
rationality, in conjunction with a permissive test for the legitimacy of leg- 
islative aims. This Article suggests, however, that since criminal legislation 
is highly invasive of liberty, the mere demonstration of a measure's 
instrumental rationality ought not to be thought sufficient to overcome the 
presumption against it. 
Parts I and II explain the difficulties with the positivistic understand- 
ing of the notion of an offense as used in the presumption of innocence and 
the ban on double jeopardy, respectively. These doctrines observe some 
striking similarities, for the positivistic understanding of an offense at the 
heart of both has engendered both similar patterns of reasoning and similar 
difficulties in the two areas. In particular, we see a certain proposal among 
commentators for avoiding the collapse of these guarantees into statutory 
concepts but that would allow courts to remain faithful to the positivistic 
orthodoxy about the notion of an offense. Parts I and II argue that these 
intermediate accounts fail where both doctrines are concerned, and that 
they fail for the same reason. Both Parts conclude that the constitutional 
doctrine in question cannot be meaningful as a source of protection unless 
independent constitutional content can be given to the notion of an offense. 
Part III considers the various cases in which the Court has developed 
either implicit or explicit substantive limitations on offense definition. 
Drawing on certain common themes that appear in these rather disparate 
areas of law, this Part proposes a jurisprudential framework for developing 
a nonpositivistic understanding of the notion of an offense. In particular, 
this framework should make it possible to develop a more stringent 
account than courts traditionally require of when legislation involving sig- 
nificant infringements of liberty is justified. It might allow us to say, for 
example, that a liberty-infringing measure is not justified if there is a sub- 
stantially less invasive measure the legislature could have adopted to 
accomplish the same end. 
Part IV begins by considering a theory that would justify use of the 
criminal sanction to prevent or punish immoral acts, a theory sometimes 
referred to as "legal moralism."43 While legal moralism improves on the 
current positivistic orthodoxy, it remains open to a number of important 
objections. This Part then explores an alternative based on a different the- 
ory of justification, namely the idea that the function of the criminal law is 
the protection of the community from those activities that inflict harm on 
others. The "harm principle," as it is often called after John Stuart Mill's 
43. See HART, supra note 1, at 6; see also MOORE, supra note 1, at 69-70. 
342 [Vol. 88:335 
POSITIVISM AND THE NOTION OF AN OFFENSE 
famous argument for the legitimacy of government,44 rivals legal moralism 
as a basis for developing an appropriate theory of justification for the use 
of the criminal sanction. From this theory of justified punishment, it may 
be possible to derive the proposed constitutional constraints on the notion 
of an offense. Finally, Part V returns to the two constitutional guarantees 
that first led us to question the positivistic approach to offense definition. It 
attempts to sketch-inevitably in extremely limited detail-how the pro- 
posed limits on the use of the criminal sanction might be used to revise 
each of these constitutional doctrines. 
This Article will necessarily paint with very broad strokes, and 
no doubt it will fail to do justice to a number of doctrinal questions, bur- 
dens of proof and double jeopardy in particular. But understanding the 
relation these doctrines bear towards the notion of an offense should help 
to raise doubts about the Court's increasingly positivistic orientation. The 
full development of an alternative theory of offense definition, however, is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
I 
POSITIVISM ABOUT THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
The presumption of innocence was constitutionalized with the case of 
In Re Winship,45 which held that the Due Process Clause requires proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt "'of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
charged."'46 The Court created no end of difficulties, however, by failing to 
specify how to identify such a fact. The natural interpretation is that the 
phrase refers to the elements of an offense. But how to decide what con- 
stitutes an element of an offense? If the concept is interpreted broadly, 
anything bearing on a defendant's liability to punishment could be part of 
the offense definition, in which case the constitutional protection Winship 
affords would be extensive. If understood narrowly, however, the prose- 
cutorial burden could be reduced to the most minimal facts, leaving the 
state free to shift the burden with respect to any number of issues that 
might bear on the defendant's risk of punishment. It is puzzling that the 
Winship Court did not attend to this difficulty, for the rule that the 
prosecution must prove every element of an offense manifestly has no 
determinate content of its own. Its meaning must derive from the underly- 
ing concept of an offense one adopts. 
The now orthodox solution to this problem arrived with Patterson v. 
New York.47 That case involved a New York homicide statute that reduced 
44. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Norton Critical Edition, 1975) 10-11 (presenting principle 
that establishes the avoidance of harm as the only legitimate grounds for exerting power over others). 
45. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
46. Id. at 363. 
47. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
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the charge from murder to manslaughter if the defendant could prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he had killed under the influence of 
extreme emotional disturbance.48 The Patterson Court upheld the burden- 
shifting provision, interpreting Winship's guarantee as applying only to 
those facts the legislature had chosen to treat as elements of the offense.49 
Since the Due Process Clause does not tell a state how to draft its murder 
and manslaughter provisions, the Court reasoned, the legislature is under 
no obligation to provide a given defense. And if the legislature can refuse 
to grant a defense, then surely it can choose to provide it but place the bur- 
den on the defendant o prove it.50 The Patterson position on burdens of 
proof thus follows directly from its positivistic understanding of the notion 
of an offense: If an offense is whatever the legislature chooses to prohibit, 
and an element is simply one of the components the legislature uses to 
define the offense, it follows that the legislature has plenary power to 
determine the parameters of the requirement that the prosecution prove 
every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The decision came as a bit of a shock to commentators, for Patterson 
eviscerated Winship, given that it effectively eliminated any restrictions 
Winship had placed on the criminal statutes legislatures can draft.51 Legis- 
latures could now obviate the presumption of innocence with respect to a 
given element simply by excluding it from the definition of the offense, 
and either converting it to an affirmative defense or eliminating it entirely. 
After Patterson, Winship amounts to the right to be presumed innocent 
with respect to whatever elements of an offense the legislature chooses to 
presume a defendant innocent. Justice Powell does not appear to have 
overstated matters when he wrote in dissent: 
A limited but significant check on possible abuses in the criminal 
law now becomes an exercise in arid formalities. What 
Winship ... had sought to teach about the limits a free society 
places on its procedures to safeguard the liberty of its citizens 
becomes a rather simplistic lesson in statutory draftsmanship.52 
The potentially far-reaching effects of its decision were not entirely 
lost on the Patterson majority, which reluctantly admitted that its position 
"may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof by 
labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes now 
48. See id. at 198-99. 
49. See id. at 210-11. 
50. See id. at 211. 
51. For criticisms of Patterson, see Marina Angel, Substantive Due Process and the Criminal 
Law, 9 LOY. U. Cm. L.J. 61, 93-111 (1977); Mark W. McLane, The Burden of Proof in Criminal 
Cases: Mullaney and Patterson Compared, 15 CRIM. L. BULL. 346 (1979); Irene M. Rosenberg, 
Winship Redux: 1970 to 1990, 69 TEX. L. REV. 109, 116-17 (1990); and Note, Winship On Rough 
Waters: The Erosion of the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1093-94 (1993). 
52. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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defined in their statutes."53 But it sought to deny the charge, claiming that 
"there are obvious constitutional limits beyond which the States may not 
go in this regard."54 It did not, however, attempt to specify what those con- 
stitutional imits might be,55 and the Court has done nothing to clarify the 
suggestion since. Most importantly, there is nothing in the logic of 
Patterson that suggests any restrictions on the power of legislatures to 
define offenses. For a limitation on offense definition would imply that 
there is some content to the notion of an offense that a legislature is 
constitutionally obligated to capture. This, however, is precisely what 
Patterson denies. 
The pre-Patterson regime, inaugurated a scant three years before 
Patterson effectively overruled it, had attempted to walk a middle line 
between full judicial oversight of criminal statutes and complete deference 
to state legislatures on the substantive doctrines of the criminal law. 
Mullaney v. Wilbur56 concerned a challenge to a Maine homicide statute 
which, like the New York provision considered in Patterson, shifted the 
burden of persuasion on the defense of provocation to the defendant. The 
Court held that the burden-shifting provision did violate the Winship 
requirement, finding that the absence of provocation was a fact necessary 
to constitute the crime of murder.57 Justice Powell suggested that the dif- 
ference between murder and manslaughter in terms of stigmatization and 
restrictions on personal iberty is so significant that it "may be of greater 
importance than the difference between guilt or innocence for many lesser 
crimes."58 Thus despite the fact that the Maine provocation provision was 
formally structured to reduce the grade and degree of the offense for sen- 
tencing purposes, the Mullaney Court used a substantive test to determine 
that its absence is an element of the offense of murder. Any other 
approach, Justice Powell argued, would leave a legislature free to charac- 
terize a matter essential to the definition of an offense as bearing only on 
the extent of punishment.59 Winship, he argued, was concerned with 
"substance rather than this kind of formalism."60 It was, however, precisely 
this kind of formalism that the Court endorsed so soon thereafter. 
53. Id. at 210. 
54. Id. 
55. It gave the example of a state legislature that wanted to declare an individual guilty of a 
crime, suggesting that this would overstep the constitutional boundaries in question. See id. at 210. But 
of course a piece of legislation of this sort would be unconstitutional for reasons other than those 
provided in Winship. It is not clear, then, whether Winship itself can be thought of as placing any 
limitations on the kind of criminal statutes legislatures draft. 
56. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
57. See id. at 703-04. 
58. Id. at 698. 
59. See id. at 698-99. 
60. Id. at 699. 
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Despite its focus on substance over form, the Mullaney Court did not 
question basic positivistic premises about offense definition. This is clear 
from the majority's insistence that the permissibility of burden-shifting 
provides only a framework for interpreting criminal statutes where the 
legislature has chosen to equip defendants with certain defenses. It does 
not place the legislature under an obligation to provide defendants with any 
such defense in the first place.61 As Justice Powell wrote in his Patterson 
dissent: 
The Winship/Mullaney test identifies those factors of such 
importance, historically, in determining punishment and stigma that 
the Constitution forbids shifting to the defendant the burden of 
persuasion when such a factor is at issue. Winship and Mullaney 
specify only the procedure that is required when a State elects to 
use such a factor as part of its substantive criminal law. They do 
not say that the State must elect to use it.... [N]othing in 
Mullaney or Winship precludes a State from abolishing the 
distinction between murder and manslaughter and treating all 
unjustifiable homicide as murder.62 
It is not implausible to suppose that it was this aspect of Mullaney, 
however, that contributed most to its early demise. For the attempt to 
articulate constitutional limits on the power of states to engage in burden 
shifting without constitutionalizing the underlying matter under considera- 
tion is inherently unstable, since, as Patterson insisted, the greater power to 
determine whether to grant a certain defense in the first place implies the 
lesser power to determine the burden of proof with respect to that ele- 
ment.63 By refusing to articulate general constitutional limitations on the 
nature of criminal offenses, Mullaney failed to provide a theoretically 
sound basis for constitutionalizing the line between offense elements and 
affirmative defenses.64 
61. See id. at 698. 
62. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 228 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
63. As the Patterson majority recognized, "[t]he Due Process Clause ... does not put New York 
to the choice of abandoning those defenses ... in order to convict of a crime which otherwise is within 
its constitutional powers to sanction by substantial punishment." Id. at 207-08; see also Martin v. Ohio, 
480 U.S. 228 (1987) (holding that placing the burden of proving self-defense on defendant does not 
violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment). 
64. Some commentators, however, object to the "greater power includes the lesser power" 
argument. The problem is supposed to lie with the premise that a legislature may permissibly pass any 
measure whose permissibility is implied by an existing power it has. From the fact that a legislature has 
a certain power it does not follow that it would ever exercise that power, given that it may be politically 
infeasible for it to do so. See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 15, at 178. It is as though someone were 
to argue that a patently unconstitutional law was constitutional because Congress has the power to 
amend the Constitution to make it constitutional. 
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Commentators for their part have mostly reviled Patterson and sided 
with Mullaney.65 But the literature suffers from an unclear view of the 
alternatives. Commentators reject Patterson because they think it possible 
to articulate intermediate limitations on the power of legislatures to engage 
in burden-shifting without working a radical revision of the powers of fed- 
eral courts to review the content of criminal legislation. But the "greater 
power implies the lesser power" argument is arguably fatal to all solutions 
of this type. That is, if the argument of Patterson is correct, there is no 
consistent principle to which courts could turn to impose constitutional 
limitations on the power of legislatures to shift burdens of proof in isola- 
tion, without controlling their right to define offenses. 
In light of the foregoing, it is regrettable that most commentators who 
reject Patterson's positivism nevertheless do not argue for constitutional 
oversight of offense definitions. Instead they continue to search for some 
sort of intermediate principle, one that would constitutionalize burdens of 
proof without constitutionalizing the underlying offense definition. Barbara 
Underwood, for example, has argued for a constitutional principle that 
would attach the reasonable doubt rule to those factors that serve to estab- 
lish individual "culpability."66 She suggests that any factor that bears on a 
defendant's blameworthiness should count as part of the offense definition. 
The focus on blameworthiness can itself be explained in terms of the pur- 
pose the presumption of innocence should be taken to serve, namely to 
compensate for the unequal resources and power of the state "by putting a 
thumb on the defendant's side of the scales of justice."67 
Another solution in this genre is one proposed by Donald Dripps. 
Here the purpose served by the presumption of innocence has to do with 
the constitutional requirement of notice.68 According to Dripps, every ele- 
ment that makes a difference to a defendant's guilt or innocence (whether 
cast as offense element or affirmative defense) is subject to the Winship 
restriction, on the grounds that the principle of legality forbids the punish- 
ment of those who have not violated the law by its enunciated terms.69 Like 
Underwood, Dripps attempts to treat the problem of burdens of proof in 
65. See, e.g., Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony Murder Rule: A Doctrine at 
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL . REV. 446, 463 (1985). But see Ronald J. Allen, The 
Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson 
v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30 (1977) (arguing Mullaney extended due process protection too far, 
and Patterson was a correction of the Court's error). 
66. See Barbara Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in 
Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1340 (1977). Underwood appears to understand culpability in a 
way that makes it co-extensive with "wrongfulness," rather than in the more technical sense criminal 
law scholars usually have in mind, which makes it a synonym for mens rea. 
67. Id. at 1306. 
68. See Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule 75 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1665 (1987) (arguing for notice-based theory of burdens of proof). 
69. See id. at 1667. 
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isolation, separating it from the more general question of the parameters of 
the underlying offense. 
What these various "intermediate" solutions share is an instrumental- 
ist interpretation of the presumption of innocence, namely an interpretation 
that makes the reasonable doubt rule a procedural device designed to 
increase the likelihood of promoting some other value the presumption of 
innocence is thought to serve.70 The presumption of innocence is not, under 
this rendering, a requirement of constitutional justice in its own right. It is 
required only insofar as it promotes some other principle commentators 
deem more fundamental. Ironically, the instrumentalist approach to bur- 
dens of proof is as much a consequence of positivistic thinking about the 
notion of an offense as is Patterson's complete deference. For on a sub- 
stantive conception of an offense, Winship does not require the addition of 
a further, external value to supply the doctrine its significance. Against the 
background of a substantive understanding of the notion of an offense, the 
rule that the presumption of innocence applies to every element of an 
offense has its own meaning. Once one has accepted the basic positivist 
premise, however, commentators who seek a way of preserving Winship 
are left with a seemingly impossible task. As Dripps aptly explains: 
"The challenge, then, is to identify a constitutional proof requirement 
independent from any constitutional requirement of what is to be proved."7' 
Ronald Allen has argued forcefully against instrumentalist accounts: 
If the constitutional interest in the reasonable doubt standard 
centers on liberty deprivation, how can the addition of a chance to 
mitigate constitutional punishment invalidate the statute? Or, to put 
it another way, if a state may constitutionally imprison all 
intentional murderers for thirty years by proving beyond reasonable 
doubt only intent and causation, then whatever liberty interest 
the defendant constitutionally possesses in the context of homicide 
prosecutions surely is fully accommodated by such a statute. 
How, then, can the addition of a mitigating circumstance in 
the form of an affirmative defense-a factor that reduces 
punishment-possibly violate the already fully accommodated 
interest?72 
But even commentators like Allen who are moved by the "greater 
power implies the lesser power" argument of Patterson do not necessarily 
endorse a substantive approach to offense definition. Allen, for example, 
proposes what he calls the "proportionality" approach, according to which 
70. See id. at 1677. 
71. Id. at 1713. Although the Patterson majority attempted to distinguish the two statutes, its 
efforts in this regard were unconvincing. The Patterson Court's attempt to distinguish Mullaney relied 
on the fact that the Maine statute made the defense of provocation a condition of sentencing, whereas 
the New York statute made it a clear affirmative defense. 
72. Allen, supra note 65, at 42-43. 
348 [Vol. 88:335 
POSITIVISM AND THE NOTION OF AN OFFENSE 
a state may shift the burden on any element as long as the sentence 
authorized for the remaining elements of the offense lies within the bounds 
of Eighth Amendment proportionality constraints.73 The Supreme Court, 
however, has now largely eliminated proportionality review outside the 
death penalty area.74 If proportionality is to supply the line between 
offenses and defenses, the concept would have to be restored to our Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence and even extended beyond its former glory.75 So 
nuanced and detailed a theory of legitimate punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment is not only unlikely to develop, but also would invade legisla- 
tive prerogative to a far greater extent than would a substantive doctrine of 
offense definition. If it is possible to approach burdens of proof by articu- 
lating limits on offense definition instead, we could accomplish the basic 
aim of Allen's approach with less revision of existing doctrine. 
This discussion of the presumption of innocence reveals a tension in 
the American legal system's understanding of the notion of an offense. On 
the one hand, there is the officially sanctioned theory of offense definition, 
one that says that legislatures have plenary power to determine the bounda- 
ries of crime, at least to the extent that the use of the criminal sanction does 
not unduly interfere with a fundamental constitutional right. On the other 
hand, a procedural principle that is central to our constitutional jurispru- 
dence depends on the notion of an offense, and that doctrine makes little 
sense as a protection for individual liberty unless the notion of an offense 
can be rendered meaningful independent of the criminal statutes it is meant 
to guide. The standard response to this tension has been to attempt to split 
the difference-to identify values external to the notion of an offense that 
the reasonable doubt rule is supposed to vindicate. But, as we have seen, 
theories that do not tie the presumption of innocence to a substantive 
notion of an offense leave the constitutional guarantee a rather thin one, 
given that it depends for its content on the good graces of state legislatures. 
73. There is only one other alternative to Patterson, as Allen sees it. This is the "political 
compromise" theory, which attempts to determine whether the legislature only decided to adopt the 
defense in question on the condition that it was able to shift the burden with respect to that element. See 
id. at 49-50. Allen suggests that the Pattersoncourt did not in fact intend to establish an elements test, 
as is commonly supposed, but that its preferred approach was the proportionality theory Allen himself 
favors. See id. While there is little evidence for Allen's interpretive claim about Patterson, he seems 
correct to favor a proportionality approach over both the approach the Patterson Court actually took, 
which is an elements test, and the political compromise approach. 
74. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (finding mandatory life sentence without 
possibility of parole for cocaine possession does not violate the 8th Amendment's protection against 
cruel and unusual punishment). 
75. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (concluding the right to be free from 
disproportionate punishment guaranteed by the 8th Amendment). 
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II 
POSITIVISM ABOUT DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
A second constitutional guarantee, the ban on double jeopardy, also 
depends on the notion of an offense. In this case, the guarantee's indebted- 
ness to this notion is textually grounded. The Fifth Amendment prohibits 
placing a person in jeopardy of life or limb twice for "the same offense."76 
This clause is thought to prohibit reprosecution of a defendant on charges 
for which he has already been either acquitted or convicted in a prior pro- 
ceeding, as well as for multiple punishment awarded in a single proceeding 
for the same offense.77 The overwhelming emphasis in both case law and 
commentary is on the former, the ban on successive prosecution.7 The ban 
on multiple punishment, by contrast, has remained largely undeveloped. 
The dominant view of the latter seems to be that it is merely a way of 
ensuring that a person convicted of a crime receive only the legislatively 
prescribed punishment.79 By contrast, a distinct set of constitutional values, 
such as a defendant's interest in avoiding the cost and embarrassment of 
repeated trials, his interest in finality, and the apparent unfairness of artifi- 
cially increasing the state's chance of convicting the defendant through 
multiple prosecutions, are believed to animate the ban on successive prose- 
cution.80 
The perceived asymmetry between the two branches of double jeop- 
ardy law is a product of the positivistic understanding of the notion of an 
offense. On the multiple punishment side, if the legislature has plenary 
power to define offenses, the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy 
has no content of its own. It merely serves to emphasize the legislatively 
established upper limit on punishment. On the successive prosecution side, 
by contrast, the doctrine has more content, since it bars a prosecutor who 
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
77. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
78. Recent notable examples of the latter include Akhil R. Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double 
Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1995); George C. Thomas III, Successive 
Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOWA L. REV. 323 (1986); Peter 
Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal 
Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001 (1980); and Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General 
Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 86. 
79. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) (holding nonconcurrent punishment 
awarded in a single trial for armed criminal action and first degree robbery does not violate Double 
Jeopardy Clause). 
80. See George C. Thomas III, A Unified Theory of Multiple Punishment, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 
1 (1985) ("[A]lthough both protections are created by the double jeopardy clause, the prohibition of 
multiple punishments is informed by different values and requires a different analysis than the 
protection against multiple trials."). It is concerned with sparing a defendant from repeated and 
harassing litigation, both because of the burdens of prosecution and because of the potential for 
artificially increasing the chances of conviction. It is also concerned with protecting a defendant's 
interest in finality, as well as in protecting his interest in having his trial completed by a particular 
tribunal. See also Westen & Drubel, supra note 78, at 86 (articulating purpose of ban on successive 
prosecutions). 
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had lost at trial from reprosecuting the defendant on precisely the same 
charges in order to try her luck with a different jury. But in neither case 
does the ban on double jeopardy have much intrinsic meaning. It does not, 
for example, prevent a legislature from shaping its criminal prohibitions in 
a way that would obviate these restrictions. A legislature could thus effec- 
tively punish multiply or authorize multiple prosecutions for the "same 
offense," as long as it sliced its offense definitions finely enough. Courts 
and commentators attempt to answer these concerns by suggesting that the 
guarantee serves a set of further values that are external to the ban on dou- 
ble jeopardy itself. This response is the counterpart of the instrumentalist 
view of the presumption of innocence we saw in the preceding Part. But 
the required external values appear to be present in the case of successive 
prosecutions but not in the area of multiple punishment. Hence the asym- 
metry between the two branches of double jeopardy law. 
The crucial question in interpreting the ban on multiple punishment 
is when two offenses are the "same" within the meaning of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.81 The prevailing test was articulated in Blockburger v. 
United States,82 in which the Court said that two offenses are not the same 
for double jeopardy purposes if "each of the offenses created requires 
proof of a different element."83 Suppose the elements of burglary are 
"enter[ing] ... a building with purpose to commit a crime therein, ... 
unless ... the actor is licensed or privileged to enter'84 and the elements of 
criminal trespass are "if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do 
so, [a person] ... enters ... any building."85 All the elements of the latter 
would be contained within the former. The two offenses thus fail the 
Blockburger test, making them the "same" for double jeopardy purposes. 
Armed robbery and bank robbery, by contrast, would pass the test, since 
each contains an element the other does not contain: use of a weapon and 
robbery of a bank, respectively.86 
Once again, the Supreme Court here evades the crucial question it 
evaded in interpreting Winship's mandate: When does a fact constitute an 
element of an offense? And once again, the Court responds with the usual 
positivist shibboleth: The elements of an offense are whatever facts the 
legislature decides to require a prosecutor to prove by including it in the 
definition of the offense.87 Just as this response left it open to legislatures to 
81. This question is of great relevance for the ban on successive prosecutions as well. 
82. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
83. Id. at 304. 
84. MODEL PENAL CODE ? 221.1(1). 
85. Id. ? 221.2(1). 
86. The Blockburger test is also sometimes referred to as the "same evidence" test, because it 
requires that each offense involve the production of evidence that the other offense does not require. If 
two offenses require proof of all the same facts, or if one offense requires proof of all the facts required 
also to prove a second offense, the two offenses are the "same" for double jeopardy purposes. 
87. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 303-04. 
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shift the burden with respect to an element by eliminating it from the 
offense definition, here there is a drafting technique the legislature can use 
to obviate the ban on double jeopardy, particularly where multiple punish- 
ment is concerned. All a legislature need do is add nonoverlapping ele- 
ments to each offense it wishes to punish separately, elements which may 
be irrelevant for identifying the evil the statute is designed to eliminate. In 
theory, for example, a legislature could distinguish bank robbery at the top 
of the hour from bank robbery at half-past, enabling it to assign separate, 
nonoverlapping punishments for any bank robbery that lasts over half 
an hour. The logic of Blockburger, the double jeopardy equivalent of 
Patterson, suggests nothing to disallow it. Once again, the positivistic 
approach to offense definition turns a constitutional guarantee that depends 
on the notion of an offense into a doctrine about fidelity to legislative 
intent. 
One way of defending constitutional doctrines with the above struc- 
ture is to see them as serving rule-of-law values. If the prosecution must 
prove every element of a statutorily defined offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, individuals are on notice of the conduct they must avoid if they wish 
to remain at liberty. And if they are law-abiding but are nonetheless 
charged and tried for a crime they did not commit, the presumption of 
innocence will maximize the chance that they will be able to defend them- 
selves effectively. Similarly, the ban on double jeopardy arguably protects 
individuals against their governments by providing some additional pro- 
tection against lawless prosecution and punishment. The positivistic inter- 
pretation of these two constitutional doctrines is thus consistent with a 
view of constitutional guarantees as ensuring fairness in the process by 
which government invades the liberty of its citizens. But while it is not 
implausible to suppose that a constitutional provision could serve such a 
function, we would need an argument for why we should understand these 
constitutional doctrines in particular as vindicating rule-of-law concerns. 
Indeed, the rule-of-law interpretation begins to look a bit strained when we 
consider that it would result in both constitutional guarantees erving the 
same function. Why, one might ask, would this function be served by two 
different provisions rather than by a single constitutional concept? Indeed, 
we already have a constitutional provision that seems more than adequate 
to the task: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Why 
would we have two additional doctrines designed to reinforce rule-of-law 
values as well, especially doctrines that purport to address entirely differ- 
ent issues? 
Moreover, the rule-of-law interpretation turns out to be particularly 
difficult to maintain where the ban on double jeopardy is concerned. For 
the commitment o positivism is more entrenched here than in the pre- 
sumption of innocence context. The Court has accomplished this by 
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making even Blockburger-type manipulation of the elements of an offense 
unnecessary. In Missouri v. Hunter,88 the legislature had made it an offense 
to use a dangerous weapon in the commission of a felony, to be punished 
separately from the underlying felony itself. The Court thus faced a situa- 
tion in which the legislature had expressed a clear intention to impose 
nonoverlapping punishments for two offenses that were the "same offense" 
under Blockburger.89 The Hunter Court took the final step in the direction 
of positivism: It relegated the same elements test to a rule of statutory con- 
struction, making it applicable only where the legislature has not spoken to 
the relation between the two offenses. It thus left the legislature free to 
authorize multiple punishment for the "same offense," as long as it did so 
clearly and explicitly. 
To see how revisionary this move was, consider the parallel in the 
burden-of-proof area. Imagine a Supreme Court decision that left a legis- 
lature free to presume the defendant guilty with respect to any element of 
an offense it wished, as long as it announced its intention to do so clearly 
and unambiguously. Would we not think a judge or commentator facetious 
who then insisted that the presumption of innocence had not lost its char- 
acter as a constitutional guarantee, on the grounds that it still served rule- 
of-law values? Yet the imagined position on the presumption of innocence 
follows as seamlessly from Patterson as Hunter does from Blockburger. In 
both contexts, the more radical rule allows a legislature to do directly what 
it is constitutionally permitted to do indirectly anyway. It is not clear, then, 
what is to be gained from forcing a legislature to pass through the largely 
meaningless notion of an element of an offense. Why not dispense with the 
element fiction, as Patterson and Blockburger already allowed with respect 
to the concept of an offense, and let the legislature state its true intent 
clearly and nonformalistically? Indeed, the due process requirement of no- 
tice would appear to be better served this way, for at least legislatures 
would have to present the risk of conviction and the potential severity of 
punishment boldly, unobscured by Byzantine formalities. 
Another argument we saw in defense of the positivistic approach to 
burdens of proof has a counterpart here.90 Surely, the argument goes, a 
legislature could authorize what amounts to the same thing as cumulative 
punishment simply by attaching it to a single offense. If, for example, the 
use of a dangerous weapon in the commission of a crime is punishable by 
five years, and the underlying felony is punishable by ten, the legislature 
88. 459 U.S. 359 (1983). 
89. At least arguably cumulative punishment would have been banned, given the Court's fairly 
consistent approach to lesser-included offenses. 
90. For the following argument, see George C. Thomas III, A Blameworthy Act Approach to the 
Double Jeopardy Same Offense Problem, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1051-53 (1995) (arguing that 
legislature may authorize multiple punishment for two offenses that are the "same" if it can punish 
either offense for the full amount separately). 
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could reach the same result as if it could punish these two offenses cumu- 
latively by authorizing fifteen years for either offense alone. If there is no 
Eighth Amendment impediment to a fifteen-year sentence for either 
offense taken separately, why should a legislature be barred from spread- 
ing the fifteen years over two separate crimes, where one is the lesser- 
included offense of the other? Consider also whether a legislature could 
constitutionally pass a statute that made the penalty for bank robbery ten 
years, and then provided that anyone convicted of bank robbery will be 
punished twice.91 Assuming that a twenty-year punishment for bank rob- 
bery is not constitutionally excessive, it would be odd to suppose that a 
legislature could not write such a statute if it could permissibly authorize a 
twenty-year penalty for the same offense. Why, then, should a legislature 
be forbidden from authorizing cumulative punishment for two offenses that 
turn out to be the "same offense" under Blockburger? Once again, the 
"greater power implies the lesser power" argument provides support for the 
positivistic approach to the relevant constitutional guarantee. 
Notice, however, that the same argument would be unacceptable in 
the successive prosecution context. For we would not want to conclude that 
a legislature could authorize multiple attempts at conviction, as long as it 
did so clearly and unambiguously. But the logic of Hunter could be made 
to apply to the ban on successive prosecutions as well. Surely, the argu- 
ment would go, the legislature could authorize successive prosecutions for 
a single transaction by slicing its offense definitions very finely. It could, 
for example, distinguish the offense of armed robbery from that of bank 
robbery, and authorize separate and successive proceedings against some- 
one accused of both offenses for a single course of conduct. Now 
assuming that the court is following the Blockburger test, the legislature 
could authorize successive prosecutions for these offenses, since each 
contains an element the other does not contain. It would seem to follow, 
according to the above argument, that the legislature could also authorize 
successive prosecutions if one offense were a lesser-included offense of the 
other, such as if one offense were armed robbery and the other robbery. 
And if there is no argument against this, then why should the legislature 
not be able to authorize successive prosecutions for a simple, noncompo- 
site offense, say, allowing the state to have two chances, rather than one, of 
convicting a bank robber? 
There have been a number of different attempts to avoid the first step 
on this slippery slope, that is, to prohibit multiple prosecutions for closely 
related offenses arising from the same transaction. There was, for example, 
91. See generally Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 302 (1965) (arguing that 
substantive double jeopardy does not limit a state legislature, but rather only the discretion of the 
courts). 
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the brief reign of Grady v. Corbin,92 in which the Court imposed a sub- 
stantive hurdle over and above the Blockburger test, barring a successive 
prosecution that would rely on the facts used to prove the offense of the 
previous prosecution. Grady involved a prosecution for manslaughter, 
which took place after the defendant had already pled guilty to a violation 
for the drunk driving that caused the death.93 Blockburger alone would not 
have ruled out the second prosecution, since drunk driving is not a lesser- 
included offense of manslaughter. The Court herefore sought to add a sub- 
stantive dimension to the concept of "same offense" in order to forbid 
multiple proceedings in this context.94 Grady, however, was quickly over- 
ruled by United States v. Dixon,95 which effectively returned the law of 
successive prosecutions to the simple Blockburger test. Commentators, 
too, have proposed various sorts of mandatory joinder rules to supplement 
Dixon. The most sensible of these would allow a second prosecution for a 
greater offense, one of whose lesser-included offenses was proven in the 
initial prosecution, when new evidence of the greater offense appears and 
the state was diligent in attempting to uncover such evidence at the time of 
the first prosecution.96 The defendant would then receive credit for time 
served under the first offense towards his punishment for the second. The 
fact, however, that these patchwork additions have seemed necessary to 
achieve just results suggests that there may be a flaw in the basic doctrine. 
As in the burden-of-proof area, the contortions that seem necessary to pro- 
tect the ban on double jeopardy reflect the need to inject substance into a 
doctrine that lacks it, due to the lack of substance in the underlying notion 
of an offense. 
One further doctrinal ramification of the positivistic understanding of 
the notion of an offense perhaps serves to illustrate the difficulties of this 
approach even more clearly. This is the problem of the "unit of 
prosecution," namely how many different instances of a given offense the 
defendant's behavior exemplifies. Two offenses that are the "same" for 
double jeopardy purposes may be cumulatively punished if the defendant 
committed that offense more than once. Thus although murder and 
manslaughter are the "same" offense, a defendant can be punished for each 
separately if he has two victims. While the point is an obvious one, it is 
often hard to determine how many times a defendant committed the 
92. 495 U.S. 508 (1990). 
93. See id.at 510. 
94. There is also the collateral estoppel rule ofAshe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (establish- 
ing a mandatory joinder rule for two offenses when the second offense would relitigate facts used to 
establish the first offense in an earlier prosecution). Justice Brennan has suggested a more emphatic 
version of this approach, namely that all offenses arising out of a single transaction be prosecuted in a 
single proceeding. See id. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
95. 509 U.S. 688 (1993). 
96. See generally Amar & Marcus, supra note 78. 
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offense when the different instances of the offense occur during a single 
course of conduct. How, then, do we determine what counts as one viola- 
tion of a prohibition and what counts as more than one? With homicide 
offenses the answer is easy: Each dead body corresponds to a different 
violation of the homicide offense, assuming that the other elements of the 
offense are satisfied. Other offenses, however, are more difficult to count. 
If a person shoots at another six times in quick succession, he can be 
charged with one count of attempted murder. If he takes one shot on each 
of six successive days, however, he can be charged with six counts of 
attempted murder. How, then, should we individuate different instances of 
the crime of attempted murder?9 
The Court has not always grappled successfully with this problem. 
The leading case is Brown v. Ohio,98 in which the defendant stole a vehicle 
in Cleveland and was caught driving the car nine days later in Wickliffe. 
He was charged with "joyriding" in Wickliffe, and after serving a short jail 
term and paying a fine, he was charged with theft in Cleveland. The defen- 
dant tried to claim that the second prosecution was barred on double jeop- 
ardy grounds, since the Ohio theft statute contained all the elements of 
joyriding, an offense for which he had already been convicted.9 Here the 
Supreme Court missed what the Court of Appeals had ably under- 
stood: that even though joyriding and auto theft are the "same 
offense" for double jeopardy purposes, the defendant could be punished 
more than once if he committed that offense multiple times during the nine 
days he possessed the automobile. The Court of Appeals addressed the 
problem and found the second prosecution permissible on the grounds that 
it was based on a second instance of the same offense. The Supreme Court, 
by contrast, appears to have overlooked the unit-of-prosecution problem. It 
found the second prosecution barred, on the grounds that "joyriding and 
auto theft... constitute 'the same statutory offense' within the meaning of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause."'?? The only allusion the Court made to the 
unit-of-prosecution problem was to say: "The Double Jeopardy Clause is 
not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the 
simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or 
spatial units."'"' The Court did indicate in a footnote, however, that matters 
97. The author is indebted to Professor Larry Alexander, University of San Diego School of Law, 
for this example. 
98. 432 U.S. 161 (1976). 
99. See id. at 163-64. 
100. Id. at 168. 
101. Id. at 169. In this opinion, the Court ran together the problems of "type" identity (whether or 
not the type of offense in question is the same in both cases) with the problem of "token" identity 
(whether there is one or more token of the type of act prohibited). The problem of cumulative 
punishment for felony murder and one of its predicate felonies is an example of the former; the 
problem of determining how many instances of joyriding the defendant in Brown exemplifies is an 
example of the second. The ban on multiple punishment will forbid consecutive sentences if there is 
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would have been different had the legislature specifically said that joyrid- 
ing is a separate offense for each day the vehicle is operated without the 
owner's consent. 02 Had the Court seen the unit-of-prosecution problem 
more clearly, then, it probably would have adopted the positivistic 
approach here as well, namely that there are no constitutional restrictions 
on how many units of prosecution the legislature carves out of a single 
transaction. 
Here too the unalloyed positivistic position produces counter-intuitive 
results. While we might easily allow that a legislature could create a differ- 
ent instance of joyriding for every day that a defendant retained a vehicle 
without its owner's consent, could it also create a different instance of that 
offense for every hour? Every minute? And if it could do so for joyriding, 
why not for theft? Could it establish a separate count of theft for each stone 
contained in a piece of jewelry, or a separate count for each different type 
of metal? While such divisions would probably not be attractive to a legis- 
lature drafting the laws of theft, there is nothing to rule them out under a 
positivistic approach to offense definition. Nor would there be any other 
constitutional provision to stand in the way of such a statute, assuming that 
the legislature had adequately publicized its bizarre statutory scheme. 
In light of the difficulties the positivistic account engenders, it is sur- 
prising that courts and commentators have not found a substantive doctrine 
of offense definition more attractive. One possible explanation for this is 
that they have studied each constitutional doctrine in isolation, with 
the result that their common core has gone unnoticed. Attempts to supply 
meaning for each constitutional guarantee have thus been localized within 
the constitutional doctrine in question, rather than spread over a wider 
constitutional structure. One commentator succinctly displays this ten- 
dency. He writes, "So the question comes down to the following: is there 
anything in the Double Jeopardy Clause definition of 'offense' that 
precludes the legislature from authorizing two convictions for a 
Blockburger greater and lesser offense? The answer is negative on 
the Court's Hunter analysis .. ."103 The same argument appears in 
Supreme Court opinions as well. Justice Rehnquist, for example, once 
wrote: "To the extent that [a substantive] . . . thesis assures that any 
particular criminal transaction is made up of a determinable number of 
constitutional atoms that the legislature cannot further subdivide into 
separate offenses, 'it demands more of the Double Jeopardy Clause than it 
is capable of supplying.'"104 
only one token of a single type. It will allow the punishment if there are either multiple tokens of a 
single type, or if there is a single token of more than one type. 
102. See id. at 169 n.8. 
103. GEORGE C. THOMAS Im, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 109 (1998). 
104. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 701 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Westen & Drubel, supra note 78, at 113). 
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But this reasoning is reminiscent of the drunk searching for his keys 
under a lamppost because, as he explains, the light is better. True, there is 
nothing in the Double Jeopardy Clause that constrains legislatures in 
defining offenses. There need not be. The Clause presupposes the concept 
rather than defines it. But assuming that the Double Jeopardy Clause fails 
to supply the meaning of the term "offense," must state law define it 
instead? Could the notion of an offense not come from elsewhere in the 
Constitution, in this way supplying a common definition that applies to any 
constitutional doctrine that relies on that notion? Among other reasons for 
searching for the meaning of "offense" outside the particular constitutional 
doctrine that employs it, we should expect the concept of an offense to 
possess the same meaning in whatever constitutional setting it appears.105 
The next Part proposes that we look for the meaning of an offense in 
our constitutional tradition of liberty. It will argue that this tradition should 
ultimately yield a constitutional theory of offense definition, given the pre- 
sumption that the right to liberty creates against the use of the criminal 
sanction. This Article, however, will not itself undertake the task of pro- 
viding such a theory. Offering a complete theory of offense definition is a 
vast undertaking, one that requires careful exploration of a number of 
thorny problems in substantive criminal law, as well as a detailed explora- 
tion of the constitutional foundation for such a theory. This Article might 
be thought of as the preamble to that larger project. It attempts only 
to indicate where one might seek to establish such a theory in our 
constitutional tradition. 
III 
LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES 
Philosophical discussions of punishment often begin with the obser- 
vation that because it involves the infliction of pain or other form of 
unpleasant treatment, punishment stands in need of justification.'0 As 
H.L.A. Hart has written, "[T]he use of legal coercion by any society calls 
for justification as something prima facie objectionable to be tolerated only 
for the sake of some countervailing good."'07 A criterion of adequacy for 
any theory of punishment, then, is that it provides an account of when 
punishment overcomes the presumption against the moral legitimacy of the 
acts it involves. A utilitarian theory of punishment, for example, that did 
105. See Akhil R. Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999) (arguing for method of 
constitutional interpretation that makes use of appearance of same constitutional term in different 
contexts). 
106. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Theory of Punishment, in ESSAYS ON DOING AND 
DESERVING 95-96 (1970); S.I. Benn, An Approach to the Problems of Punishment, 33 PHILOSOPHY 325 
(1958); A.G.N. Flew, The Justification of Punishment, 29 PHILOSOPHY 291 (1954); H.L.A. Hart, 
Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, 60 PROc. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 1 (1959-60). 
107. HART, supra note 1, at 20 (discussing theories of punishment). 
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not subtract the criminal's loss of utility from the overall social gains of 
punishment would fail to meet its burden of justification, since it would 
fail to show the practice as worthwhile in the face of the suffering it 
imposes.108 
This Part will suggest a constitutional analogue of the philosophical 
claim about punishment, namely that a constitutional order premised on 
notions of individual liberty contains what we might call a "requirement of 
justification" for the legitimate use of the criminal sanction. While the 
argument for this requirement is prescriptive, rather than descriptive, this 
Part will also suggest that this framework allows for what we might call a 
normative reconstruction of many of the Court's decisions limiting the use 
of the criminal sanction. The suggestion will be that a number of cases in 
this category limit the use of the criminal sanction at least in part 
because the deprivation of liberty involved is not adequately justified by 
the purpose for which the legislation was enacted. The claim is not that the 
Court is explicitly adopting a heightened requirement of justification in 
such cases, but rather that this is one way to interpret and to unify a 
series of decisions that otherwise look ad hoc. The claim then is that this 
interpretive framework can be defended on normative grounds, as follow- 
ing from a constitutional regime's basic commitment to liberty. 
One objection to this proposal will be that federal courts have not 
been thought permitted to engage in substantive oversight of ordinary leg- 
islation on liberty grounds for the last sixty years.'09 Not all liberty inter- 
ests, however, are created equal. Rejecting oversight of economic 
regulation on the basis of a generic due process right to liberty does not 
entail the rejection of substantive federal oversight of legislation infringing 
the right to be free from bodily restraint. Why must a person's interest in 
freedom of contract and his interest in freedom of his physical person stand 
on the same footing simply because they both constitute forms of "liberty" 
under the Due Process Clause? Moreover, it is difficult to understand a 
number of the decisions striking down criminal statutes without thinking 
that the Court is willing to impose substantive limitations on the notion of 
a criminal offense that go beyond the minimal requirement of rationality. 
These cases suggest that despite the official rejection of liberty-based 
review, decisions like Patterson and Hunter"o may be out of sync with our 
implicit understanding of the relation between individual liberty and the 
use of the criminal sanction. 
108. This is arguably the feature that condemns utilitarian accounts of punishment, since they are 
unable to exclude cases in which a murder's utility from killing exceeds the disutility the murder 
produces. In this case, punishing the offender would impose greater disutility than it would prevent. 
109. At least the point is clear with respect to economic legislation. See GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 834 (1996) ("Since 1937, the Court's abandonment of Lochner-style 
substantive due process review of economic regulation has been unequivocal."). 
110. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983). 
2000] 359 
CALIFORNIA LAWREVIEW 
The more specific legal basis for this argument has of course been 
shrinking in recent years, as the substantive reading of the due process 
liberty right becomes increasingly limited. Liberty, like property, is largely 
a formal category whose content must be determined by legislation. Deci- 
sions like Patterson reflect the piecemeal replacement of the substantive 
picture with quite a different one. The alternative picture of due process is 
fittingly sometimes referred to as the "positivistic" approach to due proc- 
ess.11 It maintains that the liberty and property interests protected by the 
Due Process Clause are positivistic concepts, the contents of which are 
supplied entirely by state law. The positivistic approach to due process 
makes the same point about the line between substance and procedure we 
saw in the burden-of-proof context, namely that it makes no sense to con- 
stitutionalize process without also constitutionalizing the underlying sub- 
stantive rules to which the process constraints apply.12 The conclusion, 
however, is precisely the reverse of the conclusion a substantivist about 
constitutional criminal law would reach: While the substantivist argues 
that this provides a reason to constitutionalize substance along with proce- 
dure, the due process positivist argues that it is a reason for federal courts 
to leave process to state legislatures as well. The result is a radically weak- 
ened conception of the Due Process Clause-the view that due process 
serves only to ensure that citizens receive those protections, whether sub- 
stantive or procedural, that states have chosen to grant them in their law- 
making capacity.13 
Judge Easterbrook, the central proponent of due process positivism, 
argues that the conceptual origins of the Due Process Clause support the 
positivist approach. He writes: 
[T]he Due Process Clause places little or no legitimate restraint on 
the contents of legislation. Judges and Presidents must follow rules 
laid down in "law"; judges may not act ex parte in important 
matters; but Congress may establish as law such procedures as it 
pleases, subject only to the constraint hat it not abrogate certain 
111. Raoul Berger and Frank Easterbrook appear to be two of its central proponents. See RAOUL 
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85; see also Louis D. 
Bilinois, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269 (1998) 
(arguing against substantivist theories of due process). For a substantivist critique of due process 
positivism, see Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values 
of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 467 (1986) ("If all aspects of due process are open to 
legislative definition, then of what possible value is the constitutional guarantee of due process of 
law?"); see also Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044 
(1984) (discussing positivistic renderings of due process). 
112. See supra text accompanying notes 62-72. 
113. See Easterbrook, supra note 111. 
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long-recognized judicial procedures when fundamental natural 
liberties are at stake.14 
In our system, Easterbrook argues, specific provisions of the Bill of 
Rights replace the reference to fundamental natural liberties. As he 
explains, "All that is left are prohibitions designed to compel other 
departments of government to follow the legislature's plan.""5 The weak- 
ness of the Due Process Clause under this interpretation is presented as a 
virtue, rather than an unfortunate necessity. According to the due process 
positivist, the Clause only has application if the executive branch falls into 
tyranny or monarchy, since its function is mainly to ensure that the execu- 
tive conforms to the will of the legislature. In ordinary law-abiding times, 
due process has no function at all. Easterbrook cites as evidence for his 
view the fact that the Clause had little or no importance in federal cases for 
many years. As he explains, "The Due Process Clause escaped the Court's 
notice for the same reason it escaped the Framers': it stated an 
uncontroversial principle that was expected to be trivial.""6 
Easterbrook's argument against the distinction between procedure and 
substance is compelling. He suggests that it makes no sense to see courts as 
the arbiters of procedures designed to protect substantive rights if state 
legislatures have the final word on the content of those rights. Easterbrook 
argues accordingly that "the Court's due process cases are incoherent 
unless the Court has its own view of substance.""7 He goes on to speculate 
that "[t]he Court must be devising procedures that vindicate the Justices' 
views of the relative importance of different substantive entitlements, 
rather than legislators' views. Substantive and procedural due process turn 
out not to be so different.""8 But the difficulty Easterbrook identifies can 
be solved in either the way favored by the positivists or the way favored by 
the substantivists. The former delegates both substance and procedure to 
state law, leaving due process to serve minimal rule-of-law values. The 
latter places substantive limits on legislatures where federal constitutional 
law controls the governing procedure. 
Bill Stuntz has argued in favor of the latter solution, on the grounds 
that "[f]or the foreseeable future, we will continue to live with a regime 
that (quite plausibly) treats criminal punishment as a different and specially 
serious deprivation of 'life, liberty, or property,' and hence one that should 
be subject to significant constitutional regulation.""9 If we assume the 
constitutionalization of criminal procedure, his concern is that substance 
will be distorted by legislatures precisely in order to obviate procedural 
114. Id. at 98 (discussing Coke's view of the notion of due process). 
115. Id. at 99. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 115. 
118. Id. 
119. Stuntz, supra note 38, at 2. 
2000] 361 
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 
restrictions. Thus, if the substantive law is not fixed, constitutional restric- 
tions on procedure will be vacuous. He writes: 
The idea of treating the criminal sphere as constitutionally special 
may make a lot of sense, but if it does, it makes sense for process 
and substance alike. Indeed, the point is stronger: without 
substantive limits, important parts of the law of criminal procedure 
seem likely to fall apart. In a world in which prosecutors can 
choose whom to prosecute, special rules for criminal procedure 
logically require substantive limits on the law of crimes. Without 
such limits, the government's natural incentive is to evade or 
exploit the procedural civil-criminal line by changing the 
substantive civil-criminal line. The upshot is that we should either 
de-constitutionalize much of criminal procedure or create a kind of 
substantive due process for criminal law.120 
Stuntz's argument for rejecting the positivistic solution and siding with a 
substantive approach is pragmatic. But the substantivist will probably need 
a stronger argument for rejecting due process positivism. For that position 
receives strong support from the fact that it would render the Court's 
positivistic decisions in the burden of proof and double jeopardy areas 
coherent. Furthermore, on no other conception of due process is this true. 
The required argument may lie in the fact that due process positivism 
is out of keeping with a number of decisions in which the Court has 
articulated substantive boundaries on the use of the criminal sanction. It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to argue for a particular theory of the due 
process liberty interest, or even to offer a doctrinal account of specific due 
process decisions. But this Part will suggest that there is a strand of our 
constitutional jurisprudence that rejects the positivist understanding of the 
notion of an offense. In this way, the hope is to show that positivism about 
the notion of an offense is more costly than one might have thought, given 
that it would require the abandonment of important substantive limitations 
on offense definition to which the Court has committed itself. There are 
thus substantive reasons for rejecting due process positivism, reasons of 
long standing in our constitutional tradition. 
Consider, for example, the cases falling under the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine. As with many restrictions on the criminal sanction, the official 
doctrine clothes what are often substantive restrictions in formal garb. The 
vagueness doctrine purports to address the language in which criminal 
prohibitions are drafted, but many of the cases reveal a concern with what 
is drafted rather than how. Officially, the doctrine requires legislatures to 
word criminal provisions with sufficient specificity to avoid arbitrary 
police and prosecutorial enforcement and to provide citizens with adequate 
notice of their exposure to criminal conviction. But often the Court's 
120. Id. at 1-2. 
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concern with specificity of formulation evinces a substantive judgment 
about the harm the prohibition is meant to avert. This concern was appar- 
ent in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,'2' where the Court struck down 
a Jacksonville ordinance identifying as vagrants a motley assortment of 
undesirable persons, from "rogues" or "vagabonds" to "persons who 
use juggling or unlawful games or plays," to "persons able to work but 
habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children."'22 
The Court offered the usual two grounds for striking down legislation on 
vagueness grounds, namely that the statute failed to provide adequate 
notice and that it authorized arbitrary and erratic use of the police power. It 
suggested its concern with the overly invasive character of the legislation 
only obliquely, saying that the presumption of future criminality the ordi- 
nance creates "is too precarious for a rule of law."123 This, as well as other 
aspects of the opinion, suggest that the Court's concern could not have 
been remedied by more careful drafting. More plausibly, the decision 
stemmed from a substantive judgment that both the quality and the quan- 
tity of interference with the targeted activities were too restrictive of liberty 
in light of the state's purposes. As Robert Post has written about this case, 
"[t]he Court could have argued that it was constitutionally forbidden to use 
judgments to impose 'lifestyle' norms on unwilling segments of the 
population, and the Court in fact trembled at the brink of just such a 
substantive due process analysis."'24 
The use of the vagueness doctrine to limit overly invasive legislation 
was even clearer in Kolender v. Lawson,'25 where the Court struck down an 
apparently much less offensive California statute requiring those stopped 
by police to furnish officers with "'credible and reliable' identification."'26 
The Court found the phrase unconstitutionally vague, on the grounds that it 
failed to specify the meaning of "'credible and reliable.'"127 Here the con- 
cern with the substance of the ordinance, and in particular with the fact that 
the infringement of liberty was insufficiently justified, was made explicit. 
Justice O'Connor wrote: "Our Constitution is designed to maximize 
individual freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty. Statutory 
limitations on those freedoms are examined for substantive authority and 
content as well as for definiteness or certainty of expression."128 
121. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
122. Id. at 163 (striking down Jacksonville Ordinance Code ?? 26-57). 
123. Id. at 171. 
124. Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 CALIF. L. 
REV. 491,497 (1994). 
125. 461 U.S. 352 (1983). 
126. Id. at 353-54. 
127. Id. at 353. 
128. Id. at 357. 
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The Court has recently used the doctrine of vagueness to articulate 
these concerns in particularly vivid colors. In City of Chicago v. 
Morales,129 the Court found a Chicago loitering ordinance unconstitution- 
ally vague. Justice Stevens, in his opinion for the plurality, emphasized that 
Chicago's purpose of reducing the level of gang-related violence was 
legitimate: 
The basic factual predicate for the city's ordinance is not in 
dispute. As the city argues in its brief, "the very presence of a large 
collection of obviously brazen, insistent, and lawless gang 
members and hangers-on on the public ways intimidates residents, 
who become afraid even to leave their homes and go about their 
business. That, in turn, imperils community residents' sense of 
safety and security, detracts from property values, and can 
ultimately destabilize ntire neighborhoods...." We have no doubt 
that a law that directly prohibited such intimidating conduct would 
be constitutional.130 
But Justice Stevens went on to say that the ordinance was more invasive 
than necessary to accomplish this end. And he pointed out that it was not 
clear that the chosen method was even effective at reducing gang violence, 
and that there might be other methods available. Of particular interest was 
the Court's reason for thinking the legislation vague and overly broad, 
namely that it infringed too extensively and unnecessarily a protected con- 
stitutional right to liberty. This, despite the fact that liberty itself is not a 
"fundamental right." Justice Stevens wrote: 
[A]s the United States recognizes, the freedom to loiter for 
innocent purposes is part of the "liberty" protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have expressly 
identified this "right to remove from one place to another according 
to inclination" as "an attribute of personal iberty" protected by the 
Constitution. Indeed, it is apparent that an individual's decision to 
remain in a public place of his choice is as much a part of his 
liberty as the freedom of movement inside frontiers that is "a part 
of our heritage" or the right to move "to whatsoever place one's 
own inclination may direct" identified in Blackstone's 
Commentaries.131 
Outside the area of vagueness, the Court was at its boldest and most 
explicit in the famous case of Lambert v. California.132 There the city of 
Los Angeles had made it a crime for any "convicted person" to fail to reg- 
ister with the police within five days of his or her arrival in Los Angeles, 
with each day's failure to register constituting a new violation. A 
129. 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999). 
130. Id. at 1856-57 (citations omitted). 
131. Id. at 1857-58 (citations omitted). 
132. 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
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"convicted person" was anyone who had been convicted of a felony in 
California, or what would have been a felony in California if the convic- 
tion were from another state.133 No knowledge of the registration require- 
ment was necessary.34 The Supreme Court found that the provision 
violated due process.'35 Although the Court allowed that the police power 
is "'one of the least limitable,"' it nevertheless tressed that "due process 
places some limits on its exercise."'36 In explaining that the statute failed to 
satisfy the constitutional requirement of notice, the Court pointed out that it 
criminalized conduct that is "wholly passive," and that "circumstances 
which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration are 
completely lacking."'37 The Court reinforced this basic substantive objec- 
tion to the statute by quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes: "A law which 
punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member 
of the community would be too severe for that community to bear."'38 
It is unfortunate that the Court did not make the grounds for its hold- 
ing in Lambert clearer. Some commentators have interpreted it as prece- 
dent against the constitutionality of strict liability offenses.'39 Others have 
emphasized the absence of a mistake-of-law defense, the fact that the stat- 
ute sought to criminalize status, or the concern about arbitrary enforcement 
that animated the Court's decisions in many of the vagueness cases. The 
deepest defect of the provision, however, was arguably that articulated in 
the influential amicus brief filed on Lambert's behalf. The brief said that 
the ordinance was an "unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy, right to 
liberty, and privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States in 
that it penalizes a morally innocent and passive status and is not reasonably 
restricted to the evil with which it purports to deal."'40 The affirmative con- 
duct the ordinance demanded was so much of a departure from the criminal 
law's usual degree of intrusion into private life, and the justification for 
that departure so feeble, that the interference with liberty it involved was 
not justifiable. 
Whether it was Lambert's influence, or simply the recurrence of the 
cluster of concerns that Lambert raised, subsequent due process decisions 
explored and expanded upon many of Lambert's basic themes. In a line of 
cases beginning with Robinson v. California,'41 the Court's concern with 
the criminalization of status, for example, became explicit. A state law 
133. See id. at 226. 
134. See id. at 227. 
135. See id. 
136. Id. at 228. 
137. Id. at 228-29. 
138. Id. at 229 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1883)). 
139. See Packer, supra note 39, at 129-30. 
140. Id. (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae for Appellant, at 21). 
141. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
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making it a misdemeanor to "'be under the influence of, or be addicted to 
the use of narcotics"'142 was at issue. The Court, finding the criminalization 
of status repugnant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, wrote: 
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt 
to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a 
leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease.... [I]n the light of 
contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal 
offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to 
be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.'43 
Although making a substantive comment about the permissible 
bounds of the use of the criminal sanction, the Court framed its concern 
gingerly. It defended the state's right to regulate narcotics traffic, and 
stressed the multiplicity of ways in which a state could seek to attack the 
drug trade without criminalizing status."4 The real problem with the meas- 
ure, it suggested, was that the statute was more invasive of liberty than rea- 
sonably necessary to accomplish the state's end. The Court was not saying 
merely that the punishment for addiction was disproportionate to the 
offense. Its concern was more general. The Court suggested that the use of 
the criminal sanction was inappropriate for dealing with a problem like 
addiction. As the Court said: "Even one day in prison would be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."'45 True, the 
reach of Robinson was sharply limited thereafter by Powell v. Texas,146 in 
which the Court refused to treat public displays of alcoholism in a similar 
vein. The Court stressed, however, that liability here was based not on 
status but on the voluntary act of taking the first drink.147 
Subsequent cases explored another issue raised in Lambert, namely 
whether a mistake-of-law defense is constitutionally mandatory. In 
Liparota v. United States,'4 for example, the Court rejected the contention 
that a statute criminalizing the unauthorized transfer of food stamps could 
provide the basis for a criminal conviction without evidence that the 
defendant knew his conduct violated the law. It distinguished Liparota 
from the long line of cases rejecting a mistake-of-law defense, on the 
grounds that those cases criminalized "a type of conduct that a reasonable 
person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may 
142. Id. at 660 n. 1. 
143. Id. at 666. 
144. See id. at 664-65. 
145. Id. at 667. 
146. 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (upholding criminal statute criminalizing public drunkenness in 
application to an alcoholic). 
147. See id. at 531. 
148. 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
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seriously threaten the community's health or safety."'49 The Court sug- 
gested that a state could regulate drugs or hand grenades with strict liabil- 
ity, since the items are so manifestly threatening to the health and safety of 
the community that potential defendants are effectively on notice of their 
vulnerability to criminal prosecution.'50 But a state cannot regulate non- 
dangerous items such as food stamps in the same way.15' Here the Court 
was even more explicit about the relevance of the type of harm than it was 
in Robinson, in that it specifically made the availability of a given defense 
turn on the gravity of the harm the statute sought to prevent. 
The foregoing cases mostly do not address the concern with liberty 
explicitly. The claim of this Part is accordingly not that these cases can be 
explained in terms of a doctrinal commitment to a general background 
right to liberty. Rather, the claim is that there is a jurisprudential frame- 
work within which these decisions would normatively cohere with a strand 
of our constitutional tradition. Another line of cases, however, is more 
explicitly concerned with liberty, namely the cases striking down legisla- 
tion in defense of a supposed constitutional right to privacy. These cases 
address the problem of excessive governmental intrusion into the lives of 
individuals through a subsidiary constitutional value. While the funda- 
mental right such cases address is officially privacy, not liberty per se, the 
distance between privacy and liberty is not very great. Protecting a right to 
privacy is another way of protecting citizens from excessive governmental 
interference. 52 
These concerns were perhaps most in evidence in the Court's opinion 
in Griswold v. Connecticut,'53 where the majority found that the decision of 
whether to conceive a child "concerns a relationship lying within the zone 
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."'54 
The Court made the connection between privacy and liberty clearest when 
it stated that the Connecticut statute could not stand "in light of the familiar 
principle, so often applied by this Court, that a 'governmental purpose to 
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may 
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby 
invade the area of protected freedoms.""55 Justice Harlan, concurring in the 
majority's opinion, would have located the constitutionally protected 
149. Id. at 433. 
150. See id. 
151. See id. 
152. As Ruth Gavison writes, "Privacy is derived from liberty in the sense that we tend to allow 
privacy to the extent that its promotion of liberty is considered desirable." Ruth Gavison, Privacy and 
the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 451 (1980). 
153. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
154. Id. at 485. 
155. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)). 
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liberty interest in the Due Process Clause itself, rather than filtering it 
through a fundamental right to privacy: 
In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether 
this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic 
values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." For reasons 
stated at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, I 
believe that it does. While the relevant inquiry may be aided by 
resort o one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not 
dependent on them or any of their radiations. The Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its 
own bottom. 156 
Finally in Roe v. Wade,157 the Court again articulated the connection 
between privacy and liberty when it treated the concept of privacy as 
"founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal iberty."'58 
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion endorsed the legitimacy of substan- 
tive review of criminal legislation, in light of the Harlan position on lib- 
erty. As he said: 
[T]he Griswold decision can be rationally understood only as a 
holding that the Connecticut statute substantially invaded the 
'liberty' that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. As so understood, Griswold stands as one 
in a long line of... cases decided under the doctrine of substantive 
due process, and I now accept it as such. 59 
Like Justice Harlan, Justice Stewart would have recognized a broad 
"liberty" right in the notion of due process that covers more than those 
particular freedoms named in the Bill of Rights. 
The classic statement of this position is of course Harlan's dissent in 
Poe v. Ullman.'60 As he wrote: 
[T]he full scope of liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific 
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is 
not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of 
property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to 
keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly 
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary 
impositions and purposeless restraints, . . . and which also 
recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that 
156. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
157. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
158. Id. at 153. 
159. Id. at 168. 
160. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state 
needs asserted to justify their abridgment.161 
Jurisprudentially, the Harlan conception of liberty captures a prevalent and 
compelling intuition, namely that human beings have a generalized right to 
liberty, or, as the point is often put, the right to be left alone.162 It is far 
beyond the scope of this Article to defend the Harlan conception of liberty. 
For present purposes, it is sufficient o point out that there is a strand in our 
constitutional history that supports a nonspecific understanding of that no- 
tion. The current, quite limited aim is simply to draw out the implications 
of this tradition for the notion of an offense, and to suggest the tension in 
which it stands with the positivist orthodoxy. While Justice Harlan himself 
did not necessarily mean to establish a broad source of limitations on sub- 
stantive criminal provisions, the background right to liberty for which he 
argued should still provide boundaries on the extent to which a state may 
interfere with the right of its citizens to be free from bodily 
restraint. The basic dividing line between the "Harlan substantivists" and 
the "Easterbrook positivists" thus emerges in response to the question 
whether the notion of "liberty" that the Due Process Clause protects is a 
formal concept, possessing only the content hat state law gives it, or a fed- 
eral constitutional norm, the boundaries of which federal law must articu- 
late. The cases where the Court is called on to pronounce directly on the 
notion of an offense, like Patterson and Hunter, take the former position. 
The cases where the Court has placed substantive limits on the use of the 
criminal sanction appear to presuppose the latter. 
This Article suggests that as long as there is a constitutional commit- 
ment to the notion of liberty in some form, then there is constitutional pres- 
sure to reject the positivistic conception of the notion of an offense. For it 
is the commitment o liberty that suggests at least a weak presumption 
against the use of the criminal sanction. From this it follows that the deci- 
sion to criminalize is one that stands in need of justification. The most dif- 
ficult challenge, of course, is to extract a specific substantive theory of 
offense definition from this requirement of justification. But that is a task 
better reserved for a future occasion. Here it will suffice to see that the rec- 
ognition of such a presumption implies the availability of some theory of 
offense definition. 
A constitutional theory of substantive criminal aw must have answers 
to two questions: First, on what grounds are federal courts entitled to 
review criminal legislation pertaining to the substantive doctrines of the 
criminal law for the adequacy of their content? Where the entitlements 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights are concerned the answer is obvious: The 
161. Id. at 543. 
162. But see RONALD WORKIN, What Rights Do We Have?, in TAKING RIGHTS ERIOUSLY 266, 
268-72 (1978) (arguing against the idea of a generic right to liberty, as opposed to particular liberties). 
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Constitution explicitly equips citizens with certain rights against their gov- 
ernments, such as the right to freedom of speech, and where legislation 
infringes one of these rights, federal judges may invalidate the legislation 
to protect the right if the state cannot justify the measure by reference to a 
"compelling state interest." But outside the area of fundamental rights the 
answer does not come easily. While the tradition of substantive due proc- 
ess provides the most likely source of these restrictions, due process posi- 
tivism suggests that a legislature has unbounded discretion to decide what 
to criminalize and how to do so, as long as the statute does not infringe a 
fundamental right. Large portions of our constitutional jurisprudence of 
liberty, however, belie this suggestion. And if there is a general due proc- 
ess interest in liberty, then at least some of the justifications a state could 
offer for the use of the criminal sanction would fail to override the back- 
ground right citizens have to be free from punishment. 
The second question a constitutional theory of substantive criminal 
law must answer follows from the first: What, specifically, are the limits 
on the use of the criminal sanction that federal courts are entitled to 
enforce? When, in other words, is the legislature's reason for the infringe- 
ment of liberty sufficiently powerful to rebut the background presumption 
against the use of the criminal sanction? The rationality requirement the 
Due Process Clause imposes on all legislation supplies the answer under 
current doctrine, but it should be clear that the minimal notion of rational- 
ity is inadequate to explain the Court's liberty-protecting decisions. 
Rationality review is usually understood as containing two separate 
tests: First, the legislature's end in passing the legislation must be 
"legitimate," and second, the legislation must be "rationally" related to this 
end. When is a means "rationally related" to the end? The answer the Court 
has generally adopted is that a statute is rationally related to the state's end 
when it tends to promote the end. The cases we have considered in this 
Part cannot plausibly be described as based on a failure of rationality. 
Instead, what appears to have driven the Court in these cases is the idea 
that legislatures may not invade liberty more than is reasonably necessary 
to advance legitimate state purposes. This appears to be a particularly 
compelling way of understanding the vagueness cases. The prohibition on 
status offenses, the implicit limitations on strict liability, and even 
the cases articulating a fundamental right to privacy, arguably evince the 
same concern. In each case, the Court's primary objection appears to have 
been not that the legislature exceeded its authority by attempting to deal 
with problems like vagrancy, but rather that there were alternative means 
available to it that would be dramatically less invasive and would accom- 
plish this same end. 
The concern with the unnecessary invasiveness of liberty-infringing 
measures would help to explain the apparent difference between review in 
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the criminal arena and review elsewhere. Arguably our Constitution cares 
about alternative means available to a legislature where liberty-infringing 
legislation is concerned, even though it does not care about this elsewhere. 
And this would make sense given the presumption against criminal stat- 
utes. Within certain broad outlines, this presumption ought not to be over- 
come unless the state can show it did not frivolously ignore a less liberty- 
infringing measure available to it. The idea that liberty infringements ought 
to be minimized thus points in the direction of a theory of offense defini- 
tion. What one would need to identify is a minimum set of elements for 
each offense that allows the offense definition to meet the above test. The 
decision to criminalize a given type of conduct would then meet its burden 
of justification if it can be shown that given the purpose of criminalizing 
that behavior, the measure adopted was roughly the least liberty-infringing 
formulation reasonably open to the legislature. Whether this suggestion can 
be made doctrinally compelling would require extensive further explora- 
tion. But the discussion of this Part should be sufficient to show that there 
are basic aspects of our constitutional jurisprudence that lend themselves to 
a substantive theory of offense definition. Positivism about the notion of an 
offense is not inevitable. 
IV 
THE HARM PRINCIPLE 
The argument of the Article thus far has been that the liberty interest 
of citizens creates a presumption against the use of the criminal sanction, 
and that therefore criminal prohibitions stand in need of justification. In 
this way, we may be able to tease rough boundaries on the notion of an 
offense out of the right to liberty. The requirement of justification restricts 
a legislature in the conduct it may prohibit, as well as in the invasiveness 
of the prohibitions themselves. A criminal prohibition that failed to iden- 
tify a harm of sufficient magnitude to overcome the presumption against it 
would be illegitimate, since it would constitute an unjustifiable interference 
with liberty. 
Thus far, however, we do not have a picture of the kind of theory of 
offense definition that would allow a court to determine when a legislature 
had met its burden of justification. To develop such a theory, we must 
"translate" the background right to liberty into a set of substantive princi- 
ples for determining the legitimate use of the criminal sanction. This is 
accomplished by identifying a principle or set of principles that determines 
when a criminal statute satisfies its burden of justification. By specifying a 
theory of justification, it should be possible to identify a set of core ele- 
ments for each legitimate offense. It should also be possible to determine 
when a state's purpose is insufficiently compelling to justify the decision 
to criminalize in the first place. We have thus arrived at a framework for 
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answering the question "What is a crime?" with which we began. A crime 
in a liberal order is prohibited behavior whose harmfulness justifies 
restricting a person's liberty in order to prevent or punish that behavior, 
according to whatever theory of justification that order accepts. To com- 
plete the definition, we must fill in the framework with a specific theory of 
justification. 
One theory of justification is that provided by the legal moralist: The 
right to liberty may be limited only for the legitimate legislative purpose of 
punishing or preventing morally wrongful conduct. As Joel Feinberg char- 
acterizes this position: 
The pure legal moralist in the strict sense demands that the law 
prevent and/or punish inherent immoralities even when they are 
harmless (because voluntary or consented to) and unoffending 
(because not forced on the attention of unwilling observers). He 
rests his entire case on the desirability of eliminating and 
preventing states of affairs whose evil, even though free-floating, is 
intuitively manifest and extreme.163 
Under at least one version of this thesis, the legitimacy of that aim can be 
accounted for by a retributive theory of punishment, and thus the back- 
ground right to liberty is limited by the need to inflict punishment deserved 
by wrongdoing. As Michael Moore defends this position, 
[R]etributivism, when combined with the principle of legality and 
the insight that law as law does not even prima facie obligate 
citizen obedience, yields the legal morality theory of proper 
legislative aim: all and only moral wrongs should be prohibited by 
the criminal law, for the reason that such actions (or mental states) 
are wrongful (or culpable) and deserve punishment.'64 
In Moore's version, the retributive principle of punishment sets the 
boundaries of what he calls our "derived right to liberty," namely the 
right not to have government regulate one's behavior for the wrong rea- 
son.'65 The derived right to liberty establishes a link between a theory of 
punishment and the scope of liberty rights, for it is only if the criminal 
sanction is imposed for legitimate punitive ends that the derived right to 
liberty is adequately respected. For the legal moralist, the only legitimate 
punitive ends are supplied by the retributivist focus on moral wrongdoing. 
The legal moralist's definition of an offense would thus be conduct that 
merits an infringement of liberty, in view of its fulfillment of the condi- 
tions of a retributive theory of punishment. According to the legal moralist, 
all and only immoral acts satisfy this condition. 
163. 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL IMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 8-9 
(1988) (discussing broad and narrow senses of legal moralism). 
164. MOORE, supra note 1, at 754. 
165. Id. at 751. 
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There are, however, familiar arguments against legal moralism, par- 
ticularly stemming from the difficulty of defending the tight connection 
between law and morality that theory asserts. First, there is the problem of 
accounting for mala prohibita crimes. While it is not implausible to think 
of the traditional common law crimes as targeting immoral acts, we cannot 
easily think of modern regulatory offenses in this way. Second is the 
problem of explaining why we fail to criminalize a number of acts that are 
manifestly immoral. Lying to a friend, backing out of a commitment, even 
cheating on a lover are normally not punishable, but they are usually 
thought immoral. These two objections to legal moralism have struck most 
scholars as sufficient grounds to reject that account of the notion of crime. 
Moore himself, however, has endeavored to defend legal moralism against 
them. 
In response to the first difficulty, Moore suggests that mala prohibita 
crimes are ones in which the legislature aims instrumentally at some mor- 
ally wrong act-type. Where mala in se crimes are concerned, the legislature 
includes the morally wrong act-type within the statement of the prohibition 
itself. Where mala prohibita crimes are concerned, by contrast, the legis- 
lature forbids an act because it tends to produce a morally undesirable state 
of affairs: 
Mala prohibita crimes are created to prevent some bad state of 
affairs from occurring. Driving a motor vehicle without a driver's 
license, for example, serves to prevent loss of life and other injuries 
to persons or property by keeping the unskilled, the ignorant, and 
the incapacitated off the roads. The morally ideal act-type is the 
one that maximally achieves this intrinsically valuable state of 
affairs.... There are thus still morally dictated act-types behind 
mala prohibita crimes even if such act-types are the product of 
instrumental calculation (rather than of the intrinsically wrongful 
nature of such act-types).166 
Moore's solution, however, seems vulnerable to the following objec- 
tions. First, it is not possible to identify a "morally ideal" act-type from an 
intrinsically valuable state of affairs; nor is it possible to identify a 
"morally dictated act-type" from a morally bad state of affairs. In each 
case, the problem is that there is no single type of act that is associated 
with the avoidance of that state of affairs. Consider the rule that requires 
people to defer to the driver on their right when cars simultaneously arrive 
at a four-way intersection. The undesirable state of affairs the rule is meant 
to avoid is a traffic accident. But any number of rules could maximally 
contribute to the avoidance of this state of affairs. For example, drivers 
could be required to defer to the driver on their left instead of on their 
right, or they could be instructed to defer to the largest vehicle, the 
166. MICHAEL MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 339-40 (1993). 
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smallest vehicle, the brightest or the darkest, the newest or the oldest. In 
general, rules meant to facilitate coordination, which many mala prohibita 
offenses are, have a certain arbitrariness to the act-types they identify, for 
any number of act-types will maximally contribute to producing a certain 
end.167 How do we determine which act-type it is justifiable to prohibit and 
which it is not? 
Another difficulty with Moore's solution is that mala prohibita crimes 
are often entirely unrelated to any item of moral concern. Moore is correct 
to suggest that mala prohibita crimes are designed to avoid undesirable 
states of affairs. But a state of affairs is not by itself an item of concern to 
morality. A traffic accident is, from a certain standpoint, an undesirable 
event, and the state of affairs in which such an accident has occurred is 
also undesirable, but so are headaches and avalanches. If avoidance of traf- 
fic accidents is a sufficiently morally worthy end to justify the use of the 
criminal sanction, then is not the avoidance of headaches and avalanches as 
well? It is not clear how exactly the legal moralist will accommodate mala 
prohibita crimes and still retain limits on the use of the criminal sanction. 
In response to the second objection, Moore argues that while it is 
always a reason in favor of punishing an act that it is immoral, the reason 
need not be dispositive. Legislatures have other legitimate goals that may 
override their concern with morality. It is not clear, however, that the legal 
moralist can accommodate this modification. For if the immorality of the 
conduct is not a sufficient condition for criminalization in these de minimis 
cases, what reason is there to suppose that it is ever a sufficient condition? 
And if an act's immorality is never by itself a sufficient condition for pro- 
hibiting it, the legal moralist's position may not ultimately stand apart from 
any number of other theories of criminalization, since many theories could 
take the position that an act's immorality is a necessary condition for 
criminalizing it and still think the moral status of an act relatively unim- 
portant. 
167. Moore's account of double jeopardy makes use of this framework. The essential idea is that 
two offenses are the "same" for double jeopardy purposes if they share the same morally salient act- 
type. See id. at 337. Consider, however, the above criticism as applied to that account. In the case of 
crimes that are mala in se, a court trying to determine if two offenses are the "same" for double 
jeopardy purposes must locate the morally wrong act-type the legislature had in mind in drafting each 
offense, presumably whether or not the legislature has properly identified the act-type in question. Then 
a judge must decide whether the two offenses have a morally wrong act-type wholly or partially in 
common. If so, the two offenses cannot be punished cumulatively, and otherwise they can. But how is a 
judge supposed to identify the relevant act-type in the case of crimes that are mala prohibita, given that 
no ideal act-type can be inferred from the specification of a state of affairs as undesirable? If the act- 
type analysis means that a judge must look to ideally wrong act-types rather than to the elements of an 
offense, it is not clear how she is supposed to decide whether crossing the center median in a vehicle 
and reckless driving are the same offense. 
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These arguments against the legal moralist are far from complete.168 
Undoubtedly Moore would have compelling responses to them. Without 
purporting to have disposed of the legal moralist's approach to crime, we 
might nevertheless find these difficulties sufficiently worrisome to investi- 
gate an alternative. Instead of seeking to justify interference with liberty by 
the need to punish morally wrong acts, one might think of the relevant jus- 
tification as stemming from the harmfulness of the prohibited conduct. We 
might, in short, adopt the "harm principle" as the justification for interfer- 
ing with liberty. In On Liberty,169 Mill wrote, "the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."170 The harm 
principle differs from legal moralism because the notion of harm is not 
necessarily connected with the moral character of the action that produces 
it. Accordingly, the avoidance of harm provides a morally neutral legisla- 
tive aim, one, however, that seems capable of supplying a substantive justi- 
fication for infringing liberty. And just as legal moralism suggests a 
retributive theory of punishment, so the harm principle implicates its own 
theory of punishment, one that serves to link the background concept of 
liberty with the notion of a criminal offense. There is no convenient name 
for such a theory, but it is easily characterized. The theory of punishment 
that goes with the harm principle is a theory that views punishment as jus- 
tifiable insofar as it focuses on the avoidance of harm, rather than on the 
avoidance of immoral acts.'71 
As Moore points out, there are a number of criticisms of the harm 
principle a legal moralist might make.172 For example, he might question 
why the infliction of harm provides a good reason to limit liberty. What is 
it about harm-prevention that justifies governmental coercion? Moore sug- 
gests that most harm inflicted on others is morally wrong, and that this 
provides the real justification for interfering with harm-producing con- 
duct.173 Thus, he would argue, harm is not in and of itself an adequate justi- 
fication for restricting liberty. It appears to be so only insofar as harming a 
person normally wrongs him. We also sometimes punish "harmless 
wrongdoing," such as defamation of the dead or public nudity. Are we not 
right to punish such conduct on the grounds that it is morally 
168. For a thorough exploration of the problems with legal moralism, see 1-4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE 
MORAL IMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984-88). 
169. MILL, supra note 44. 
170. Id. at 10-11. 
171. One might suppose this describes a deterrence-based theory of punishment, but this would be 
incorrect. Deterrence is a theory about the correct quantum of punishment, rather than a theory 
identifying which acts to punish and why. The point is confusing, since retributivism provides both an 
answer to the question of what to punish and an answer to the question of how much punishment is 
due. Other theories of punishment address these questions separately. 
172. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 753. 
173. See id. 
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reprehensible?'74 Finally, Moore points out that there are many instances of 
causing harm that are not punished, such as harming someone through 
economic competition. Does that not show that punishment cannot be 
directed towards the avoidance of harm?175 
While these points are compelling, they are far from conclusive, and 
in light of the following responses, they are not generally thought to clinch 
the case against a harm-based theory of criminal prohibition. First, from 
the fact that many instances of harm-infliction involve morally wrongful 
conduct, it does not follow that the moral wrongfulness of the conduct is 
the reason for punishing it. Indeed, Moore's argument seems to reverse the 
usual way we think of the relation between immorality and harm: We are 
normally inclined to think of conduct as morally wrongful because it is 
harmful, rather than the other way around. It thus seems more plausible to 
say that the reason we punish certain acts and the reason those acts are 
wrongful is the same, namely that the conduct inflicts harm. Second, it is 
not at all clear that the supposed cases of "harmless wrongdoing" are not 
predicated on the harm principle after all. It is plausible that a person can- 
not be harmed after he is dead, but that does not mean that a law prohibit- 
ing defamation of the dead does not aim at harm-prevention. Such acts can 
be harmful to those who are alive, perhaps because it is disturbing to hear a 
loved one defamed, or because it creates insecurity to the living to know 
they might be defamed after death. Public nudity may not appear to inflict 
any identifiable harm, but it may inflict a more diffuse harm, for example, 
the erosion of social practices of respect for bodily integrity. 76 Third, no 
one supposes that all harms are proper objects of punishment. Accordingly, 
we should not understand the harm principle as providing sufficient condi- 
tions for the justification of punishment. What the notion of harm supplies 
in this context is a threshold condition for justified punishment, the 
absence of which makes the more political and pragmatic considerations 
that legislatures debate irrelevant to the permissibility of the proposed 
criminal offense. 
What about accounting for mala prohibita crimes? Does the harm- 
based theory fare better than legal moralism? It is easier to justify prohib- 
iting conduct for instrumental reasons on a harm-based account than it is 
on the comparable legal moralist account. For if the use of the criminal 
sanction is justifiable in order to avert harm, it does not much matter if the 
prohibited behavior is productive of some further harm or whether it is the 
behavior itself that is harmful. In either case, the required set of elements 
174. See id. 
175. See id. 
176. Feinberg, who mounts a compelling defense of the harm principle, nevertheless concedes that 
such cases must be addressed outside that principle. He accordingly suggests supplementing the harm 
principle with the "offense principle," which would justify prohibiting conduct that causes serious 
offense as well. See generally 2 FEINBERG, supra note 168. 
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would stem from the nature and magnitude of the harm in terms of which 
the use of the criminal sanction is justified. Mala prohibita crimes thus 
appear to be easily accommodated on a substantive account of offense 
definition, as long as the principle of justification that theory supplies 
remains morally neutral. 
Thus far this Article has suggested that a liberal order is committed to 
a background right to liberty that can be justifiably infringed only for the 
purpose of harm-avoidance. If this is correct, it is plausible to think that it 
also imposes a requirement on legislatures to draft criminal offenses in a 
way that contains a clear specification of the relevant harm. This is the 
function that the core elements are meant to serve: A criminal offense 
must be constituted by the basic elements necessary to identify the harm 
that justifies the punishment associated with that offense. A legislature can 
always add additional elements, over and above those minimally required 
to meet the burden of justification. But a criminal offense is under- 
specified when the harm the statute targets is insufficient to justify the 
degree of interference with liberty the statute imposes, taking into account 
the other means available to a legislature for satisfying its purpose. And if 
the conduct the statute targets is not a harm at all, there is no offense defi- 
nition a legislature could select that would justify its prohibition. 
When the requirement of justification is interpreted in light of the 
harm principle, it provides a plausible way of understanding a number of 
the cases we considered in the previous Part. Vaguely worded statutes that 
fail to identify the harm towards which the criminal measure is directed are 
problematic because they will often be used to target nonharmful conduct 
by police and prosecutors. One cannot be sure from the terms of the statute 
alone that the restriction on liberty will be justified by the harmfulness of 
the conduct the statute prohibits. Moreover, we might say that a statute 
does not satisfy its burden of justification unless that justification is pub- 
licly available from the explicit terms of the prohibition. The vagueness 
cases thus help us to refine further the requirement of justification. That 
requirement demands not only that the criminalized conduct produce some 
harm the legislature has a valid purpose to prevent, but also that the harm 
be sufficiently identifiable to make the statute's justification apparent from 
the terms of the offense. 
These themes also underlie the prohibition of status offenses and the 
mistake-of-law cases we considered: The identification of the prohibited 
conduct must leave potential defendants a way of avoiding the harm the 
law seeks to prevent, a condition that follows from the goal of harm avoid- 
ance. That opportunity is not available if the offense criminalizes a state of 
being instead of behavior, or if it criminalizes wholly passive behavior or 
other behavior that the offender had no reason to know was harmful. 
Notice that this opportunity need not be available on a legal moralist's 
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account, since there is no reason to think that a person cannot deserve 
punishment for being in a depraved moral state. It would also explain why 
it is not a defense that the defendant did not know his conduct was crimi- 
nal, except in those cases of mala prohibita where the prohibition has 
received inadequate publication. It is a defense, however, if he did not 
know its nature and effects, a disparity the harm theory readily explains. If 
the conduct is harmful in and of itself, as is the case with mala in se crimes, 
the defendant is on notice of the possible illegality of his conduct. If the 
conduct is only instrumentally connected to some harmful state of affairs, 
the defendant cannot be expected to know that his conduct is illegal, and 
thus he must be placed on notice through publication. 
In the privacy cases, the Court found that the balance between the lib- 
erty interest the criminal statute infringed and the harm the legislature 
sought to prohibit was not sufficient to meet the burden of justification. In 
some cases, such as Griswold,"77 the invasion of liberty may be particularly 
objectionable because the offense may not identify anything one could 
plausibly consider a harm in the first place, either in itself or 
instrumentally. It is not surprising, therefore, that the cases striking down 
statutes on privacy grounds mostly concern consensual conduct or conduct 
that does not affect the interests of persons other than the actor.78 The 
"harm" the statute seeks to prevent in such cases is minimal or nonexistent, 
and thus the Court often sees the infringement of liberty as unjustified. 
There is interesting jurisprudential precedent for turning to a harm 
principle to develop a theory of justified criminalization. Bentham seems 
to have had something of the sort in mind when he insisted that laws, 
criminal offenses in particular, must be "complete."'79 Bentham's idea of 
what makes a law complete is tied to the notion of harm. He writes that 
every law must be made "upon the consideration of some mischief' the 
legislature wanted to discourage.80 Whether a law is adequately premised 
on the prevention of a given harm is not a matter to be left entirely to leg- 
islative judgment, for Bentham offered the requirement of completeness as 
a criterion for assessing legislation. He argued that a law is incomplete "in 
point of design" if the mischief the statute specifies "deviates from that 
which... it is thought [the legislator] should and might have formed to 
177. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
178. The notable possible exceptions to this are the abortion cases. But the overwhelming majority 
of those inclined to treat abortion as a matter for private choice also are inclined to think that a fetus is 
not the bearer of separate interests of its own. Those, like Judith Thomson, who wish to argue for the 
permissibility of abortion even under the hypothesis that the fetus is a bearer of interests, however, 
need not reject the harm principle. They need only think that the harm inflicted is not sufficiently great 
to warrant interference with the liberty right of the mother to choose. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A 
Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 61-62 (1971). 
179. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 156-83 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970) (describing how 
complete law varies according to fullness of pattern). 
180. Id. at 160. 
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himself."'81 In this light, it should seem somewhat ironic that Bentham is 
ranked as among the most committed proponents of legal positivism. The 
charge is not altogether incorrect, given his adherence to a command the- 
ory of law. But he nevertheless allows for some important restrictions on 
the notion of "law" that eliminate some commands from counting as law, 
in particular, those that fail to identify discrete harms. Thus the application 
of the harm principle to the basic identification of criminal offenses this 
Article has proposed echoes Bentham in its suggestion that any harm or 
evil the legislature wishes to prohibit must satisfy certain internal condi- 
tions for its own "completion." A theory of offense definition is simply a 
way of requiring that legislative attempts to discourage harm identify the 
relevant harm in its totality if the interference with the liberty of subjects is 
to be constitutionally justifiable. 
This Article will not make specific proposals for when a court should 
judge the harm principle satisfied and the burden of justification for an 
offense definition met. But it would nevertheless be useful to consider 
more concretely how a harm-based theory of offense definition would 
work in at least one fairly stark example. Once again, the current Article is 
mostly concerned with suggesting a possible framework within which a 
constitutional theory of offense definition might be developed. But the 
plausibility of the framework will be enhanced by showing how such a 
theory might operate in the "easy" cases, namely the cases in which our 
intuitions are reasonably clear. 
A typical definition of rape is sexual intercourse with another person 
"by force or threat of force against the will and without the consent of the 
other person."'82 Suppose a legislature is concerned about the difficulty of 
gaining convictions in rape cases due to problems of proof. It therefore 
decides to allow the prosecutor to establish a prima facie case on the basis 
of intercourse alone, shifting the burden to the defendant to disprove the 
charges by showing that he acted without force and with the consent of the 
other person. Would it be permissible for a legislature to structure its 
offense definition this way? As we saw in Part I, Patterson was right to 
equate the restrictions on the prima facie case with the restrictions on the 
definition of the offense itself. The question, then, is whether it should be 
impermissible for a legislature to criminalize rape itself in this form. While 
the point is not entirely beyond argument, a legislature ought not to be able 
to forbid consensual intercourse between adults. We can put the point in 
general, jurisprudential terms by suggesting that sexual intercourse 
between consenting adults is not a harm or evil that could justify the use of 
the criminal sanction. Under the harm principle, a criminal offense whose 
purpose it is to prohibit immoral but nonharmful conduct is not justifiable 
181. Id. 
182. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, ?463(a)(1) (1957). 
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as a valid infringement of liberty. A court could thus find that the proposed 
rape statute failed to meet its burden of justification. 
But what about the Georgia anti-sodomy law the court upheld in 
Bowers v. Hardwick?'83 If the Court is predominantly concerned with 
harm, and the harm the Georgia legislature sought to avert by criminalizing 
sodomy was sufficient to justify the significant infringement of the liberty 
interest citizens have in sexual autonomy, arguably the more serious harm 
of rape could justify vastly greater infringements on that same interest. 
Would the harm principle help to supply a theory of offense definition in 
this case? 
Bowers, however, is a rather stunning illustration of why a harm- 
based theory of justified criminalization is to be preferred to both positiv- 
ism and legal moralism. Had the Court recognized a harm-based account of 
offense definition as a legitimate way of protecting individual liberty it 
probably would have found the use of the criminal sanction in Bowers 
unjustified. At the very least, adopting a harm-based theory in the place of 
either a morality-based theory (legal moralism) or no theory at all 
(positivism) would focus debate about such statutes in the right place. The 
question would become whether forbidding consensual sodomy was suffi- 
ciently important to public welfare to justify the extensive infringement of 
liberty involved. At any rate, private "immorality" such as this might be 
presumed to be nonharmful. Any argument for its prohibition would 
require a demonstration of its ill effects on others. While much would have 
to be filled in to articulate fully a theory of harm, our tradition generally 
assumes that nonimpaired adults are the best judges of their own interests, 
and thus the fact that conduct is consensual is usually sufficient o suggest 
its nonharmful nature. 
Now return to the hypothetical rape statute we considered above. In 
this case, the harm or evil, namely forcing intercourse on an unconsenting 
participant, is more significant than intercourse between consenting adults. 
At least if we were to characterize the legislative purpose as discouraging 
forced intercourse, the aim of the statute would be quite a compelling one 
on a harm-based approach to justification. The question then would be 
whether the chosen measure was more liberty-infringing than necessary to 
prevent the harm in question, or whether there was a feasible, less liberty- 
infringing means the legislature might have chosen to accomplish its pur- 
pose. Considered in this light, it seems reasonable to require that a prima 
facie definition of rape contain either force or nonconsent as an element, 
since attempting to prevent rape by criminalizing ordinary intercourse is 
183. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state statute criminalizing consensual sodomy). The 
opposition to this case, however, suggests that it may be out of keeping with mainstream constitutional 
principles. See FARBER ET AL., supra note 41, at 548-51 (presenting different objections to decision). 
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significantly more liberty-infringing than reasonably necessary to accom- 
plish the only legitimate legislative purpose in this area.18 
Matters become slightly more complicated where mala prohibita 
crimes are concerned, but not insurmountably so. The problem is often that 
either the measure adopted seems too remotely related to the harm for the 
prohibition to be justified, or the harm must be speciously characterized. 
For example, we would probably be tempted to identify every traffic regu- 
lation as a measure designed to increase automobile and pedestrian safety. 
But is this really sufficient o justify the minute requirements of the typical 
motor vehicle code? Surely a state could eliminate a large number of these 
measures without a significant loss in safety. On the other hand, we can 
characterize the end more narrowly, so that the measure will bear a more 
productive relationship to the state's purpose. The "no right on red" rule of 
many cities and some states may not be a required safety measure, since 
many states do without it. And it does impose a significant burden on driv- 
ers in loss of time and increased driver frustration. If we characterize the 
end of such legislation as minimizing conflicts between drivers and pedes- 
trians in dense urban areas, however, the selected means seems more sen- 
sibly related to the end. In this case, we would have to ask whether there 
was a significantly less invasive alternative the legislature could have 
adopted to accomplish the same purpose. Or consider the analysis one 
might make of legislation dictating which side of the road to drive 
on: While forbidding driving on the left is liberty-infringing, it is no more 
liberty infringing than the other available alternative for coordinating traf- 
fic, namely forbidding driving on the right. The third alternative, allowing 
drivers to choose for themselves, is admittedly less liberty-infringing, but it 
would not advance the legitimate legislative purpose of minimizing the 
number of accidents. 
This Part has sought to present the outlines of a substantive theory of 
offense definition that is consistent with the dominant approach to liberty 
in our constitutional tradition. Such a theory seems necessary because the 
prevailing positivistic approach to the notion of an offense is out of keep- 
ing with that tradition, and the other important alternative to positivism, 
legal moralism, seems to strain our intuitions in many important respects. 
Let us now return to the two constitutional doctrines with which we began, 
184. Notice, however, that if we characterize the legislature's purpose more broadly, such as 
reducing the amount of intercourse, including unconsented-to intercourse, the purpose is arguably no 
longer legitimate. We can in this way fix an unnecessarily broad selection of means simply by 
changing our characterization of the end, and thus assume that the means is not irrationally or 
disproportionately related to the end. But in this case, we vastly expand the invasiveness of the end, and 
the measure would fail because of the illegitimacy of the state purpose. In general, a legislature's 
purpose becomes quickly rather bizarre when we start expanding the legislative purpose outwards to 
tighten the relation between means and end. And indeed the rational basis test is interpreted more 
plausibly if the end is characterized more narrowly and the real review pertains to the choice of means. 
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in order to give a rough sense of how a substantive theory of offense defi- 
nition would alter them. 
V 
TOWARDS A SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH TO BURDEN OF PROOF AND 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
A substantive theory of offense definition would place limits on the 
freedom of legislatures to define offenses. The result would be limits on 
the ability of the legislatures to engage in burden-shifting, as well as limits 
on their ability to authorize multiple punishments for a single offense. In 
the burden-of-proof context, the core elements for each offense would 
establish the elements the legislature could not permissibly convert to 
affirmative defenses, given that this would remove them from the prima 
facie case."85 By contrast, a legislature could shift the burden with respect 
to nonmandatory elements of an offense, that is, elements that lie outside 
the core. One way of understanding this is to think of the nonmandatory 
elements of an offense as extra, that is, nonmandatory protection for liberty 
under the Due Process Clause. If, however, a legislature does choose to 
include nonmandatory elements in its offense definition, Winship will ap- 
ply to those elements. For the presence of an element in an offense defini- 
tion places citizens on notice that the state will have to make out certain 
facts in order to establish a prima facie case of guilt for that offense. By 
including elements in an offense definition that exceed the constitutionally 
required minimum, a state establishes an expectation that individuals will 
be free from the reaches of the criminal law if those elements are not satis- 
fied, and this expectation creates liberty rights that courts may not obviate. 
Understanding the prosecution's burden of proof in terms of manda- 
tory elements of an offense would make good sense of Winship as a 
constitutional guarantee. The decision would stand for the proposition 
that the state must bear the burden of proving that minimum set of ele- 
ments necessary to vindicate the liberty interests of individuals under the 
Constitution. We can then understand the presumption of innocence as a 
constitutional guarantee with a significance and a content of its own. That 
doctrine would require, for example, that a man be presumed innocent of 
rape until a prosecutor had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
185. It at least requires the specification of such a set for any offense to which constitutional 
limitations on burdens of proof and related matters apply. As Larry Alexander has explained this 
position: 
For the substantivists, there are federally defined core elements of each crime that cannot be 
eliminated, functionally as well as formally, or made into defenses, the burden of which is on 
the defendant. A federal law of substantive crimes, developed under the Due Process Clause, 
or the Eighth Amendment, is the substantivists' Winship-preserving alternative to 
Mullaney/Patterson. 
Alexander, supra note 39, at 209-10. 
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victim was nonconsenting. The legislature could neither draft its rape pro- 
vision in such a way that excluded this element, nor shift the burden to the 
defendant to disprove it, since either scheme would eliminate the element 
from the prima facie case. 
Defenders of Patterson-type positivism might object that criminaliz- 
ing intercourse without including an element like nonconsent falls outside 
the limits of constitutionality to which the Patterson majority referred. 
Perhaps the Patterson majority would have been prepared to regard shift- 
ing the burden of proof with respect to nonconsent as a violation of due 
process. But if so, the proponent of Patterson-type thinking must confront 
the following question: What is the difference between shifting the burden 
on nonconsent in rape and shifting the burden on extreme emotional dis- 
turbance in murder? It is not a sufficient response to say that the Due 
Process Clause ensures that states observe only the most minimal proce- 
dural safeguards. For the power to review a provision shifting the burden 
to a rape defendant to prove consent is presumably no greater than the 
power to review a provision shifting the burden on extreme emotional dis- 
turbance. Someone who took this line, then, would need to provide an 
argument for why a legislature is obligated to include an element like non- 
consent in rape and not obligated to include an element like lack of 
extreme emotional disturbance in murder. Furthermore, any such argument 
would by necessity be substantive; no formalistic reasoning will explain it. 
We might, then, summarize the difficulty with positivism about the notion 
of an offense as follows: If the positivistic approach is incompatible with 
recognizing limits on the power of legislatures to define the elements of an 
offense, it is inconsistent with other established principles of our constitu- 
tional jurisprudence-in particular, principles having to do with the pro- 
tection of individual liberty. If, on the other hand, it is compatible with 
recognizing limits, it must also be compatible with a substantive theory of 
offense definition. Either way, there is reason to reject Patterson's positiv- 
ism about the notion of an offense. 
Unfortunately, most problems of offense definition are murkier than 
that of rape and nonconsent. Consider, for example, the relation between 
self-defense and homicide. Should we think of the absence of self-defense 
as an implicit element of all homicide offenses? Or is the absence of self- 
defense a nonmandatory element, thus allowing a legislature to shift the 
burden to the defendant? The question boils down to whether overcoming 
the presumption against the prohibition on intentional killing depends on 
exempting those who act in self-defense from the scope of the prohibition. 
And this, in turn, depends on the harm the prohibition is meant to address. 
Here we have fewer clear intuitions to guide us than we had in the case of 
rape and nonconsent. One feature of this example, however, may help. 
Notice that the norms that justify the prohibition on intentional killing 
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apply equally to killing in self-defense. That is, the relevant harm is ending 
the life of another human being. And this justification remains applicable 
even if we do not exempt killing in self-defense from the scope of the 
norm. For killing one's attacker inflicts this harm on him, even if it does so 
justifiably. Compare this with the example of rape: If we eliminate the 
element of nonconsent from the scope of the prohibition, the conduct pro- 
hibited by the offense definition itself is not the harmful conduct whose 
prohibition justifies the interference with liberty. Here the element of non- 
consent is essential to identify the harm that justifies the decision to crimi- 
nalize. Thus where killing and self-defense are concerned, we have two 
separate norms and two separate principles of justification: the norm that 
justifies the prohibition on killing and the norm that permits killing in self- 
defense. The latter norm does not supplement the former; it overrides it. 
That is, the prohibition on homicide reflects the law's commitment o the 
protection of human life and the prevention of harm. Self-defense, by con- 
trast, reflects a moral entitlement o repel wrongful violence against one's 
person. The latter stems from a different aspect of our moral and political 
philosophy than does the prohibition on homicide. And if this is correct, it 
would not be necessary to include the absence of self-defense in a murder 
statute in order to identify the harm the crime of murder prohibits. It would 
follow that the absence of self-defense is not a constitutionally required 
part of the offense definition for murder, manslaughter, or any other homi- 
cide offense, and thus that legislatures could permissibly place the burden 
on defendants to prove it. 
We can draw some general conclusions from the foregoing examples. 
The need to justify the imposition of the criminal sanction suggests that we 
should treat a defense provision as part of the offense it qualifies when the 
prohibition cannot meet the requirement of justification without it. By 
contrast, when the offense provision is "complete" in the absence of the 
exonerating condition, the latter provision will not lie within the core of 
required elements and so may be treated as an affirmative defense. Our 
discussion of rape and murder shows that an exonerating condition is likely 
to be an implicit part of an offense definition and required for the latter's 
completion, if the principle that justifies the condition is the same as that 
which justifies the prohibition itself. That is, where the defense provision 
and the offense definition are both justified by the same principle or norm, 
the absence of the defense provision will probably be required to complete 
the norm the offense expresses. By contrast, an exonerating condition is 
likely to be external to the offense definition if the justification for the 
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condition is different from that which justifies the rule of prohibition. In 
the latter case, the condition may be treated as an affirmative defense. 86 
Before turning to the problem of double jeopardy, let us digress 
briefly to address a general question about the constitutional core for 
offenses. Is the mens rea requirement for an offense part of the constitu- 
tionally required offense definition, or should only actus reus elements be 
included in the core? To answer this question, we will first require a dis- 
tinction between the notion of core elements and a close cousin of that idea 
the criminal aw already contains, namely the idea of a "material" element. 
The Model Penal Code defines "material element of an offense" as an ele- 
ment that, among other things, is not unconnected with "the harm or 
evil... sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense."'87 While 
both material and core elements are "connected" with the harm or evil the 
offense seeks to prohibit, the core elements are those material elements that 
are required for the offense definition to meet its burden of justification. 
We should accordingly think of the test for "core" elements as more 
restrictive than the test for "materiality." A legislature could include a con- 
stitutionally extraneous element in its offense definition that would still be 
"material."'88 Most proponents of a substantive approach to offense defini- 
tion urge the substantive stance precisely because they want to be able to 
insist on the inclusion of mens rea as a constitutional requirement.'89 Their 
claim is most often that punishing in the absence of a mental state is 
unconstitutional because it inflicts the suffering and stigma of criminal 
conviction on a person who is not morally blameworthy.190 Some accord- 
ingly propose a minimum mental state requirement for all offenses, such as 
negligence or recklessness.19' It may seem strange, then, that this Article 
has argued for a constitutionally required set of offense elements without 
including mental state elements in the set. But the omission of mental state 
elements is defensible on a harm-based theory of offense definition, and 
indeed it may be required. First, unlike the case of legal moralism, a harm 
186. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Claire Finkelstein, When the Rule Swallows 
the Exception, in RULES AND REASONS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FREDERICK SCHAUER (Linda Meyer ed., 
1999). 
187. MODEL PENAL CODE ? 1.13(10). 
188. The comparison with the problem of materiality may help to allay a possible objection to the 
idea of a constitutionally required core-that the idea is so vague and indeterminate that courts will 
never be able to develop a consistent set of standards for identifying its constituents. But what the 
comparison with materiality shows is that judges presiding over criminal cases are routinely required to 
make determinations that are every bit as fuzzy and imprecise. There is no reason to suppose it would 
be appreciably more difficult to specify the core elements of an offense than it currently is to specify 
which elements of an offense are material. 
189. See Packer, supra note 39, at 152. 
190. See id. 
191. See id. This is ultimately the position the Model Penal Code recommended, restricting the use 
of strict liability to de minimis infractions better thought of as violations than crimes. See MODEL 
PENAL CODE ?? 2.02(1) & 2.05(1)(a). 
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theory does not require that the offender is morally blameworthy for pun- 
ishing him to be justified. The proposals for constitutionalizing mens rea, 
by contrast, suggest a commitment to a moralized view of the criminal law. 
Second, the characterization of a harm or evil does not normally require a 
specification of the mental state with which that harm is inflicted. The 
object of a prohibition is some type of undesirable conduct, such as killing 
or taking the property of another, rather than conduct engaged in with a 
mental state of a certain sort.192 The mental state is not itself part of what is 
prohibited. This is not to say that there should be no constitutional restric- 
tions on the use of strict liability in the criminal law, but just that any such 
restrictions must be based on constitutional values other than those con- 
tained in the due process liberty entitlement.193 
If mental state elements are not part of the constitutionally required 
core, it follows that a legislature could constitutionally place the burden on 
a defendant to prove any mens rea-negating defense as well.'94 The defense 
of mistake, for example, can normally be derived from the mental state 
element of an offense definition. If the crime of theft is defined as "tak[ing] 
or exercis[ing] unlawful control over ... movable property of another with 
purpose to deprive him thereof,"195 a person who took movable property 
under the mistaken belief that it was his own would not satisfy the offense 
definition, since his mistake would negative the mens rea required for 
theft.'96 Defenses like mistake are better thought of as an implicit part of 
the offense definition than as affirmative defenses when the criminal 
offense does contain a mens rea requirement. Thus, if the scienter require- 
ment in theft were constitutionally required, it would be constitutionally 
impermissible for a legislature to shift the burden of proof with respect to 
the defense of mistake, since that would be tantamount to making the 
absence of culpability a defense rather than its presence a requirement. If, 
however, a scienter requirement is not part of the core, as suggested, then it 
192. See MOORE, supra note 166, at 3. 
193. Recently Alan Michaels has approached the constitutionality of strict liability in a fashion 
similar to the one taken here towards other elements of an offense. He argues that there is no uniform 
answer to the question of the permissibility of strict liability. Instead, he suggests that the legislature 
may impose strict liability with respect to a given element if the conduct the statute addresses could be 
constitutionally criminalized without that element. See Michaels, supra note 6, at 833. Michaels' 
approach to the problem of strict liability shares with the present Article the suggestion that certain 
elements of an offense may be constitutionally required while others may be superfluous. It is with 
respect to the latter that a legislature may impose strict liability, according to Michaels, and that it may 
shift the burden of proof to the defendant, according to the argument provided here. Michaels' article 
addresses strict liability only. On the present account, however, not only does the theory of offense 
definition apply to other kinds of elements, but it ought not apply to mental states at all. 
194. This is the case assuming, once again, that mens rea is not constitutionally required for other 
reasons. 
195. MODEL PENAL CODE ? 223.2(1). 
196. See id. ? 2.04(1)(a). 
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would be permissible for the legislature to shift the burden on the defense 
of mistake. 
Let us now turn to the ban on multiple punishment for the "same 
offense" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. On a substantive theory of 
offense definition, the central question of double jeopardy law would have 
a nonarbitrary answer. The question of when two offenses are the "same" 
and when different would once again be approached by comparing the core 
elements of each. Suppose, for example, the offense of murder contained 
the required elements of causation and the death of another 
human being. Any other elements a legislature might wish to include 
would be constitutionally "optional," such as making the statute applicable 
to fetuses as well.197 Murder and manslaughter would thus have the same 
constitutionally required core, since the same two elements that made up 
the core of murder would make up the core of manslaughter as well. We 
should expect this result, given that we have excluded mental state ele- 
ments from the core, since the essential difference between murder and 
manslaughter is mens rea. The result makes sense and tracks current law. 
The legislature should not be allowed to punish more than once for murder 
and manslaughter when these charges arise from a single killing, since both 
prohibitions express the same background norm. Thus a court can deter- 
mine whether two offenses are the same or different by asking whether the 
two offenses have the same or different background justifications. In the 
case of offenses and defenses, we saw that a defense should be thought 
"affirmative" when it stems from a different background justification from 
the justification that applies to the offense definition. The same logic is at 
work here: Two offenses are the same if they stem from a single back- 
ground justification and different if they stem from two different justifica- 
tions. 
Bringing a substantive approach to offense definition to bear on the 
doctrine of double jeopardy preserves the character of the doctrine as a 
constitutional guarantee. For a state could not obviate the ban on multiple 
punishment simply by tacking on a different element to each of two 
offenses with a common core. It could not, for example, authorize multiple 
punishment for two offenses that are the "same" for double jeopardy pur- 
poses by including the term "unlawfully" in a murder prohibition and 
including the term "fetus" in the manslaughter provision. Since neither 
element would be part of the mandatory core, their inclusion would not 
serve to make them different offenses for double jeopardy purposes. Nor 
could the legislature simply announce its intention to punish the same 
197. The term "human being" in a murder statute is usually not taken to include fetuses. See 
Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (1970) (holding murder statute inapplicable to killing of fetus). 
This application of a statute must therefore be provided for explicitly. 
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offense twice, as condoned by Missouri v. Hunter.198 Any statute authoriz- 
ing such a punishment scheme would be unconstitutional, and courts 
would be under an obligation to interpret ambiguous statutes o as to avoid 
this result or to strike down the statute if this proved impossible. 
How, more specifically, would the above structure solve the two doc- 
trinal questions about double jeopardy we have considered? Once again, 
this Part does not purport to offer a revised theory of double jeopardy, but 
rather simply to indicate how a substantive approach to the notion of an 
offense would affect the constitutional guarantee. A complete theory must 
await the articulation of specific restrictions on the notion of an offense 
under the Due Process Clause. Nevertheless, we can trace the domain in 
which a revised theory of double jeopardy would operate. First, let us turn 
to the question of cumulative punishment for an offense and one of its 
lesser-included offenses, and consider the difficult question of whether it 
would be permissible for a legislature to authorize cumulative punishment 
for felony murder and for the predicate felony used to prove it. If felony 
murder is constitutionally permissible, it must be because the constitution- 
ally required core for murder does not include a mental state element, as 
we have supposed. The core set of elements for any predicate felony, like 
rape or armed robbery, will then be substantially different from the core set 
of elements for felony murder. Both rape and murder express independent 
norms of prohibition, and each offense has its own background justifica- 
tion. The two are related in this case, or so the argument might go, only by 
legislative fiat. The legislature has chosen to include a nonmandatory 
mental state requirement in the definition of murder, and it allows that 
element to be satisfied by the mental state for the predicate felony. But if it 
need not, strictly speaking, have done so, then we are entitled to think of 
these as two separate offenses expressing two quite different norms. On a 
substantive approach to offense definition, then, it seems plausible to allow 
for cumulative punishment for each offense. 
By contrast, a substantive approach would probably not authorize 
cumulative punishment for the two offenses involved in Hunter, namely 
armed criminal action and its underlying felony. For arguably the prohibi- 
tion on possessing a weapon does not have its own independent back- 
ground justification, as shown by the fact that weapons possession is not 
illegal as such. Here a potentially legal activity is rendered illegal because 
another felony is committed in conjunction with it. This suggests that there 
are not two separate norms of prohibition, but only one. Punishment should 
therefore run concurrently rather than cumulatively. 
While the overwhelming tendency of the cases on double jeopardy 
lies in the positivistic direction, there is some legal support for the sub- 
stantive approach. The support, however, derives almost entirely from the 
198. 459 U.S. 359 (1983). 
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successive prosecution cases, where the Court has at times been tempted to 
develop doctrines that would preempt legislative manipulation. Ex Parte 
Nielson,199 for example, involved a man who had been living with two 
wives, who was tried first for unlawful cohabitation and later for adultery. 
The second prosecution did not technically violate the "elements" test, 
since cohabitation required living together but did not require sexual rela- 
tions, while adultery required unlawful sexual relations but did not require 
cohabitation. Nevertheless, the Court found that the two offenses were 
essentially the same, in light of the fact that both offenses were meant to 
prohibit the same harm or evil. What the Nielson Court recognized is that a 
legislature should fashion a single crime to address a single harm or evil.20 
If the legislature criminalizes the same harm twice, albeit in slightly differ- 
ent terms, this should not be sufficient to subject a defendant o two sen- 
tences for what is in essence the same crime. Of course the legislature may 
have wanted alternative formulations of the same offense, since the ban on 
double jeopardy does not bar a prosecutor from charging a defendant with 
both offenses, and it need not even prohibit conviction for both, as long as 
the state does not punish each offense separately. Under these circum- 
stances, the constitutional guarantee will require a state to choose, by 
insisting that it inflict only a single punishment for the perpetration of a 
single harm or evil. 
Notice, too, that a substantive approach to the notion of an offense has 
the advantage of allowing us to dispense with the asymmetry between the 
two branches of double jeopardy law, since the concept of an offense will 
provide the necessary demarcation for both. Thus, not only should a court 
compare the core elements of two offenses the legislature has drafted to 
determine whether sentences for them can run cumulatively or must run 
concurrently, it should apply the same test to determine whether it is per- 
missible to bring a second prosecution for an offense arising out of the 
same transaction as an earlier prosecution. If, for example, the state tries a 
defendant for manslaughter, whether he is acquitted or convicted at the 
first trial, he cannot subsequently be tried for murder. The reverse would 
also clearly be true: A conviction or acquittal for murder would bar a sub- 
sequent prosecution for manslaughter. If, however, a defendant shoots 
someone in the course of committing a robbery, he could first be tried for 
armed robbery and later for murder arising from the gunshot wound. 
This would solve the GradylDixon problem, where the defendant is 
convicted for a minor infraction arising out of a transaction in which he 
exposed another to a risk of death, and the victim later dies. Although the 
Court has adopted a variety of techniques to deal with this situation,20 the 
199. 131 U.S. 176 (1889). 
200. See id. at 186-88. 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96 and sources cited therein. 
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resulting doctrine is convoluted and ad hoc. Without entering into this 
labyrinthine area of law in detail, the substantive approach holds out the 
promise of a simple and elegant solution. The state may impose successive 
prosecutions on a person who has committed two or more distinct offenses, 
identified according to the substantive approach to offense definition, and 
otherwise it must try all charges in a single proceeding. Thus the defendant 
in Grady could be tried for manslaughter in a separate proceeding after he 
had pled guilty to drunk driving, since the core elements for the traffic 
offense and for manslaughter are not the same (nor is one contained within 
the other). On the other hand, once the state prosecutes someone for 
attempted murder, it cannot bring a second prosecution for murder if the 
victim of the attempt subsequently dies. While this may seem a regrettable 
result, it does not seem unfair to require the prosecution to choose between 
a speedy conviction for attempted murder and a more time-consuming 
conviction for murder, all the while retaining the possibility of prosecuting 
attempted murder if no death results within the required time. 
It might be argued that this approach is overly harsh by comparison 
with the current law on successive prosecutions, for it would not at present 
be possible for the state to try a defendant more than once for different 
offenses arising out of the same transaction in many circumstances, uch as 
when the facts needed to prove the offense at the second trial formed the 
basis for the prosecution's case in the first.202 This rule is thought necessary 
to protect defendants against the harassment of multiple prosecutions for 
the same underlying events. But there is no reason to suppose that the ban 
on double jeopardy was ever meant to be a rule about harassment. Indeed, 
as was pointed out in the debates surrounding the drafting of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, a legislature might authorize multiple prosecutions as a 
protection for those accused of crimes, rather than as an unwanted source 
of harassment.203 The standard refrain about harassment and the value of 
202. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
203. See Remarks of Mr. Benson discussing proposed draft of constitutional amendment in First 
Congress (August 17, 1789), in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, OURCES AND ORIGINS 
310 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). This point is easy to see by imagining the following scenario. Suppose 
the legislature wants to remedy what it thinks is a problem with excessively proconviction sentiment 
among juries, and the resulting long sentences and possibly unfair convictions they seem to engender. 
It therefore passes a measure requiring a new trial for each year of incarceration a defendant faced as a 
result of conviction for a given offense. To sentence an offender to 20 years, for example, the 
prosecution would be required to bring 20 different trials and impanel 20 different juries, one for each 
year. Suppose, further, that a defendant could always waive this extra protection, and elect to have all 
20 years adjudicated in a single trial. It would seem odd to suppose that the ban on double jeopardy 
would forbid a legislature from passing such a measure. True, it might be unnecessarily wasteful, and it 
would arguably work a serious unfairness on the state. But there does not seem to be a violation of the 
rights of a defendant in allowing such a scheme, since the defendant could elect the procedure that he 
saw as most advantageous. Thus if we are to preserve the identity of double jeopardy as a constitutional 
guarantee, and also preserve the notion of a constitutional guarantee for individuals as a right they 
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closure in the literature and opinions on successive prosecution24 is remi- 
niscent of the proceduralist interpretations we saw in the burden-of-proof 
context.25 Where there appears to be no intrinsic justification for a certain 
constitutional guarantee, commentators cast about for some additional 
value that is "external" to the constitutional doctrine, in an effort to vindi- 
cate the doctrine by seeing it as instrumentally related to that value. These 
contortions, however, only become attractive when needed to breathe life 
into a constitutional guarantee that has been deprived of its otherwise natu- 
ral content. Against the background of a substantive theory of offense defi- 
nition, we can take both the presumption of innocence and the ban on 
double jeopardy as constitutional values in their own right. There is no 
need to cast about for some further constitutional value these doctrines are 
meant to serve. 
Let us now consider whether a substantive theory of offense definition 
can shed light on the second problem we considered in the double jeopardy 
context, namely the unit-of-prosecution problem. This is a fiercely difficult 
problem, one that has troubled commentators and practitioners alike for 
many years. The suggested framework for a theory of offense definition 
will not be able to solve the difficulty, but hopefully a fully articulated 
account of the notion of an offense would. For while the legislature will 
ordinarily have fairly broad discretion to determine the relevant unit of 
prosecution, the requirement of justification would place boundaries on the 
units of conduct to which criminal offenses apply. Permanently removing a 
person's property without his consent, for example, is a harm that theft 
statutes seek to discourage. But it is not appreciably worse to steal property 
and retain it for fifteen minutes than to retain it for ten. For this reason, a 
statutory scheme that treated every ten minute interval as a separate 
offense might fail to meet its burden of justification, since it would make 
the potential punishment for a single wrongful act of theft arbitrary and 
arguably more invasive of liberty than reasonably necessary. 
This kind of restriction on criminal legislation, however, may seem 
pointless. What contribution to liberty does restricting legislative decisions 
about the unit of prosecution serve? The restriction itself, however, need 
not itself promote liberty. It is rather that restrictions on the notion of an 
offense follow from a right to liberty. Then against the background of a 
substantive notion of an offense, it is possible to give noninstrumental 
meaning to the ban on double jeopardy. Instead of asking what purpose 
that doctrine serves, we take the constitutional provision as sufficient 
grounds for the doctrine, and then proceed to interpret the provision in 
possess against their governments, we ought not to think of the avoidance of harassment as the main 
value the ban on successive prosecutions is designed to protect. 
204. See generally Drubel & Westen, supra note 78. 
205. See supra text accompanying notes 64-73. 
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light of the notion of an offense on which it rests. We need not ask, for 
example, about the purpose of the right to free speech before we conclude 
that such a right exists. The textual provision is sufficient grounds for tak- 
ing the right to be fundamental. 
A second answer, however, can also be given that helps to situate 
individuation restrictions in the tradition of individual liberty on which we 
have been drawing. On a substantive approach, the elements of an offense 
should bear some internal relation to the underlying value the offense is 
meant to protect. If the legislature wishes to protect its citizens against the 
harm wrought by insecurity in property rights over movable objects, the 
individuation of offenses should track our ordinary divisions among those 
objects. If, for example, the legislature wishes to guard against theft of 
barn animals, it ought to assign one count of theft for each animal removed 
from its owner. This is particularly important for traditional malum in se 
crimes. It is arguably the harm-based nature of the prohibition that makes it 
fair to assume citizens are on notice of the illegality of their conduct. Thus 
a statute criminalizing theft of a single cow as fifty counts of theft-one 
corresponding to each cut of beef the cow could produce-could easily fail 
the notice requirement. Notice is of course its own doctrine, and thus it 
might seem that any concern with notice could be addressed directly 
through the Due Process Clause. But that doctrine traditionally requires no 
publication for mala in se crimes. Actual notice, therefore, is not required. 
Arguably, the doctrine of presumptive notice is only acceptable because 
the crimes to which it applies track natural offense divisions. And thus 
notice and the substantive notion of an offense point in the same direction. 
The requirement that legislatures observe "natural" divisions, how- 
ever, is less stringent for mala prohibita crimes. For here there are few 
intuitions with which statutory publicity must compete. Thus a regulation 
dividing a cow up in a counter-intuitive way is less damaging if it pertains 
to a labeling requirement for beef rather than theft. And this is why publi- 
cizing a statute may sometimes cure a defect in the individuation of 
offenses for mala prohibita crimes, but why such defects are harder to cure 
for crimes that are mala in se. 
Finally, even if notice were not problematic, allocating a separate 
punishment for each cut of beef would probably leave the punishment for 
stealing an entire cow unjustified, given the significant deprivation of lib- 
erty it would involve. For not only would a defendant be subject to sepa- 
rate but cumulative penalties for a single transaction, but he could be tried 
fifty times for what is essentially the same harm. The power a legislature 
could give to prosecutors for any otherwise minor offense would be exten- 
sive. And given the general absence of proportionality constraints outside 
the death penalty area, the punishment for some conduct could easily 
become extremely harsh. Indeed, the problem would not even be entirely 
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alleviated by resuscitating the jurisprudence of proportionality. For that 
doctrine would place an upper bound on permissible punishment for each 
instance of a given offense. It would not limit the total number of instances 
of an offense for which a defendant could be prosecuted arising out of a 
single transaction. In this sense, the doctrine of double jeopardy, on a sub- 
stantive interpretation, seems a necessary concomitant of the Eighth 
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 
This Part has offered only the most general indication of how a sub- 
stantive theory of offense definition would revise the presumption of inno- 
cence and the ban on double jeopardy. It has tried to show that a simple 
and natural interpretation of each doctrine would emerge if combined with 
a substantive theory of offense definition. While current criminal law 
jurisprudence is committed to seeing the notion of an offense as a legisla- 
tive concept, to import this perspective into constitutional provisions that 
depend on the notion of an offense is both distorting and anachronistic. 
The view of criminal offenses as creatures of legislative fiat is a relatively 
recent one. A constitution that built its criminal guarantees around a view 
of crime as created law would probably have been structured quite differ- 
ently from our current Bill of Rights. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The positivist understanding of the notion of an offense appears to be 
the terra firma on which the various debates about constitutional criminal 
law take place. This is a curious feature of contemporary criminal law 
jurisprudence, for such an approach seems neither required by our criminal 
law concepts nor internally consistent with our constitutional tradition. 
Indeed, as this Article has argued, it stands in some conflict with the aspect 
of that tradition that has to do with individual liberty, on at least one 
prevalent and compelling understanding of that notion. It should also be 
stressed that the positivist stance is not a necessary concomitant of a non- 
moralized view of the notion of an offense. It is an unfortunate feature of 
the moder conception of law that the alternative to law as the arbitrary 
exercise of sovereignty is the highly moralized legacy of natural aw theo- 
ries. One of the advantages of securing rights through a constitutional 
structure is that "created" law can be limited by and interpreted in light of 
the more general principles of our political philosophy that constitutional 
structure expresses. In this sense, our most basic constitutional concepts 
are neither wholly "created" on the one hand nor entirely "discovered" on 
the other. 
The alternative to positivism about the notion of an offense this 
Article has explored treats the notion of an offense as the product of a the- 
ory of justifiable interference with liberty. That theory is based on an 
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argument about the role of harm in justifying infringements of liberty. A 
number of important questions, however, remain unanswered, and whether 
a substantive theory of offense definition is ultimately defensible will 
depend on the plausibility of the answers we give them. First, this Article 
has not sought to provide a complete theory of punishment. What the 
harm-based theory of justified liberty-infringement suggests is only that 
criminal prohibitions track harm that justifies the particular infringement of 
liberty the statute authorizes. A harm-based theory of punishment would 
require extensive further argument to be convincing, and in particular to be 
convincing as an articulation of a constitutional theory of justified liberty- 
infringement. 
Second, this Article has not attempted to provide any account of harm 
itself. What exactly is a harm and what kinds of harms are of sufficient 
gravity to justify infringing the liberty of citizens? A more precise specifi- 
cation of the proper objects of criminal prohibitions would ultimately 
require a more thorough account of the notion of harm. The absence of a 
theory of harm, however, is not a lacuna of a theory of offense definition. 
For the concept of harm need not itself be constitutionally specified. And 
unlike liberty and property, the notion of harm need not be legislatively 
defined if it is not constitutionally supplied. There are certain concepts the 
law must borrow from ordinary practices. But a theory of harm is none- 
theless necessary if legislatures and judges are to apply a harm principle to 
judge actual legislation, and thus the notion of harm will have to be a well- 
defined one. 
Finally, the notion of liberty requires much greater exploration. For 
the limits on the notion of an offense will be the mirror image of the shape 
of the right to liberty citizens possess. If, as many appear to think, there is 
no general background protection for liberty per se, limits on offense defi- 
nition will remain ad hoc and difficult to justify. Alternatively, they might 
disappear altogether. 
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